A new political system in Armenia

Armenia held parliamentary elections on April 2, the first to be held after a series of substantial constitutional and electoral system changes largely implemented after a 2015 referendum. The changes, which were controversial owing to the disputed referendum, changed Armenia's system of government from a system of semi-presidentialism to a parliamentary system, and changed the electoral system from a mixed-member majoritarian system to an equally unique system of party-list proportional representation.

The electoral system

Armenia's experience of democracy before Soviet rule shortly after World War 1 was very much limited, and as a result it was in a similar place to much of post-Soviet Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990: left with the difficult business of building from scratch a system of democratic and constitutional government.

Many post-Soviet countries, along with various other democratising or reforming nations around that time, introduced mixed-member electoral systems. Armenia's 1995 election law provided for a 190-member legislature, with 150 members elected through a two-round system (though candidates only had to secure 25% of the votes to win in the first round). The remaining forty seats were elected through a closed-list proportional representation system, making a mixed-member majoritarian system with a remarkably low share of party-list seats.

For post-Soviet countries with new and weak political parties, independents were relatively successful in the district tier elections. In Russia's first democratic election (in 1993) independents won 48% of the district vote: similar results were, and still are, in the Ukraine.

In the district tier for Armenia at the 1995 election, independent candidates won 72 of the 150 seats, making them by far the largest party in this tier. The Republic Bloc, a party tied to incumbent President Ter-Petrosyan, won 68 district and 20 list seats, making them the largest party (an Organisation for Co-Operation and Security report stated that the President would have the support of two-thirds of the legislature, implying that many independents were actually allied to the President). No other political party won more than ten seats.

Independent candidacies, however, have waned over recent elections in the nation, as can be seen above. Part of this may be a result of the change in the share of seats allocated on the party list; the share increased at the 1999 and 2007 election. It can also be attributed to the relative dominance of the Republican Party, a party that has been the largest at every presidential and legislative election since 2003 (though they have been dogged by allegations of electoral fraud). This represents an increasing institutionalisation of the party system, as parties (a party, to be precise) becomes the key part of elections.

The new electoral system represents what will likely be a complete removal of independent candidacies from Armenian politics. The full document, passed last year, divides Armenia into thirteen electoral districts. Parties must nominate a list in each district, and a national list. When voters vote, they choose a party list, and may also cast a preference vote for a candidate on the district list.

Seats are initially allocated between using the Hare quota and largest remainders, with a threshold of 5% for parties and 7% for alliances of parties. However, after the Electoral Commission determines the seat allocation, if no party receives at least 53 seats (a majority of the 101-member Assembly; such a party would then receive a top-up to give them 54% of the total seats), and no 'stable majority' coalition (a group of parties which has been allocated at least 54% of the seats in this preliminary distribution agreeing on a Prime Minister) can be formed within three days, a second round is held three weeks later between the top two parties or coalitions. A further four seats are allocated to ethnic minorities, and there are quotas for women representation.

In the second round, new parties may join with the parties or coalitions in the top two, though seats won by parties outside the top two in the first round are apparently not altered by the second round results. The party that wins in the second round is allocated 54% of the total number of seats.

For allocation of seats to actual candidates within parties, for each party half of their seats are allocated to the candidates on the national list (which is closed). The remaining seats are allocated between the districts using the Hare quota again (based on the number of votes cast for the party in each district, so if the Republican Party were to get 20% of the vote in Yeravan District, 20% of the Republican Party's district seats would be allocated to candidates in the district). Seats are allocated to the highest polling candidates within districts. The system is similar to that passed in Italy in 2015 (see this article for details) but later ruled unconstitutional.

In this election, the Republican Party appears to have won a majority even without the special provisions. The party won 49% of the vote, equivalent to 54% of the vote amongst those parties that passed the threshold. The normal Hare distribution of the 101 seats would give them 55 seats (near-exact 54% of the Assembly).

The new Constitution

Up until a criticised 2015 referendum, the 'Yes' campaign in which was supported by the Republican Party, Armenia was a semi-presidential country. This means that it had a directly-elected fixed-term President as head of state, as well as a Prime Minister as head of government responsible to the majority of the National Assembly, who both share executive power.

The 2015 referendum, in which the proposal was approved by 66% of the vote, changed the system to one that appears to be parliamentary; where executive power is in the hands of a Prime Minister responsible to the legislature. The President is elected by the majority of the National Assembly, but it is explicitly stated that "The Government (the Prime Minister and Cabinet) shall be the highest body of the executive power".

Few discretionary powers are granted to the President, who is not even vested with the power to appoint the Prime Minister; instead, he is expected to appoint the candidate who has the support of the aforementioned guaranteed parliamentary majority. He cannot veto legislation, and the determination of policy is reserved to the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The question of whether this will increase the power of the Republican Party, and its leader (incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan) is a most interesting one. For Mr Sargysyan, at least, the change will allow him to remain in control of executive power beyond the two-term limit proscribed for the presidency under the previous semi-presidential system. 

In a more general sense, if the party system of a country is fragmented, parliamentary governments can be dependent upon shifting coalitions (for example, the Presidency of Nauru) and the parties supporting them can hold only a minority of the legislature, reducing their ability to pass legislation. When a great deal of Armenia's parliament was comprised of independents, a parliamentary government would have been weak, and the fixed-term and non-removable status of the Presidency can give the executive strength through stability.

On the other hand, under a presidential system, the possibility exists that the Presidency and legislature can be in different partisan hands, thus depriving the President of the power to pass legislation. A Prime Minister must at least have the tolerance of the legislature in order to stay in office, and the election law in Armenia actually guarantees a party a fairly comfortable parliamentary majority (this is underlined by a constitutional requirement that one party or coalition must end with 54% of the Assembly seats).

A Prime Minister with disciplined control of his majority political party can pass whatever legislation he supports, and also has control of the executive branch. If the Republican Party are able to maintain control over their members, the new electoral system and system of government will substantially increase their power.

The Russian proposal for a new Syrian constituition

As the conflict in Syria continues, the various parties in the conflict have continued to debate and disagree upon a means of resolution. Recently, the Russian Foreign Ministry presented a proposal for a new Constitution for post-war Syria, which you can find here.

Most of my readers will be aware of Russia's support for the government of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War. While Syria under Mr Assad's rule has had a constitution, up until 2012 the document entrenched the rule of Mr Assad's Baathist Party, which controlled the National Assembly and presented a single candidate to the electorate to be accepted or rejected in a referendum (these referendums generally resulted in 98-100% 'victories' for the Baathist candidate).

It was only in 2012, once the civil war had started, that Mr Assad amended the document through another referendum, which secured a claimed 89% approval but was boycotted by rebel and opposition groups and condemned by Western leaders. No mention is now made of the Baathist Party, and the Presidency is now directly elected for a seven year term, renewable once, from amongst candidates who receive the nomination of 35 members of the 250-member People's Council.

Opposition members and Western leaders have claimed that this is merely window-dressing, and no candidates with the support of the armed domestic opposition contested the 2014 presidential election, which was won by Mr Assad with 88.7% of the vote, a poll condemned by the West and called into question on statistical grounds.

It's clear, then, that it won't just be institutions that will have to change for the conflict to be resolved in a way acceptable to the armed opposition: nominally democratic institutions can clearly be subverted, and there needs to be a spirit of good faith amongst the various participants for institutions to work. Nonetheless, institutions matter, and it is worth looking at the Russian proposal to see what its effects might be.

Rights, Freedoms, and Devolution

As is now the norm, the draft constitution contains a list of 'Basic Principles', which in very general terms outline the roles the Syrian government is expected to play, and a later list of Rights and Freedoms. These promise freedom of religion, freedom of economic activity, a ban on discrimination based on gender and origin, freedom of speech (excluding "social, racial, national or religious hatred or hostility"), the right to privacy, and various others. Some more specific economic rights are included, such as the right to work in safe conditions and the right to medical care.

However, more interesting in this section is the provisions regarding decentralisation and language. The north-east of the country, a region known as Rojava, is dominated by the Kurdish ethnic group. This region is currently controlled by the 'Syrian Democratic Forces', a Kurdish-led group which has introduced a unique and relatively democratic form of government. The Kurds will want to keep some of this separate status in a post-conflict Syria.

In relation to this, the proposal promises that government agencies of the "Kurdish cultural autonomy", a term which is left to be defined by law, shall use Kurdish and Arabic in equal amounts. Syrians are also granted the right to educate their children in their "native language", and regions are granted the right, subject to approval by a referendum, to use another "majority language in addition to the official language".

It is also stated that "Syria consists of constituent parts" and that "the organisation of local authorities is based on applying the principle of decentralisation of authorities and responsibilities". Nonetheless, this is undermined by the fact that all of the powers for these local authorities, as well as their boundaries, are dependent upon national law. The lack of any explicit guarantee over the status of these authorities would likely represent a sticking point for Rojava, which may want to hold onto its autonomous status.

Structure of Government

The proposal calls for a bicameral legislature. The lower house, named the "People's Assembly", is directly elected for a four-year term: details such as the electoral system are left to legislation. It has the exclusive power to ratify treaties.

The upper house, named the "Constituent Assembly" (at least in this translation: normally such a name is used for bodies that draw up constitutions) is to consist of "representatives of the constituent parts (the regions)". Its composition and term lengths are left to legislation. It appoints judges of the highest court (the Supreme Constitutional Court), as well as the chairman of the National Bank.

In terms of passage of legislation, both houses and the President have the authority to introduce legislation, but legislation is to be first examined in the People's Assembly. If the law receives majority approval (note that it appears to require the majority of the legislature, not merely the majority of those present), it then proceeds to the Constituent Assembly. Again, it requires majority approval of the entire Assembly.

If this is denied, a committee of the two houses may look at the legislation. Failure for this to get the legislation approved by both houses means that the People's Assembly, by a two-thirds majority, may send the legislation to the President's desk; otherwise, the legislation fails.

The Executive

Executive power, under the document, is shared between the President and the Government. The President is elected by the two-round system for a seven-year term, renewable once (it has been speculated that this is in place to allow Mr. Assad to hold power for an extra fourteen years). Candidates will still require the support of 35 members of either the Constituent or People's Assemblies. Oddly enough, there is no fixed date for presidential elections; the date is chosen by the People's Assembly, but must be within a certain window of the expiry of the incumbent President's term.

The President has substantial power under this proposal. They are given the authority to represent Syria in international relations, to declare states of emergency with approval of the Constituent Assembly and to approve or reject legislation passed by the legislature (which may override rejection by a two-thirds majority in a joint sitting of both houses). The President can be removed from office after being charged with high treason or another grave crime by the People's Assembly through a two-thirds vote, the approval of the charges by the Supreme Constitutional Court, and a two-thirds vote of the Constituent Assembly to remove the President.

A semi-presidential system is proposed, which appears to be of the president-parliamentary subtype. This means that the President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and ministers: this government must be appointed "based on the proportionate representation of all ethnic and religious groups". The government is also responsible to the legislature, that is to say, it can be removed by a no-confidence vote of the legislature in joint sitting.

However, the balance is tilted in favour of the Government and President by a provision requiring that no-confidence motions be signed by one-third of the members of either the Constituent or the People's Assemblies: if the motion fails, none of those members may sign another no-confidence motion. No no-confidence motion may be carried during a state of emergency.

In the book Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers, David Samuels and Matthew Shugart show how under the president-parliamentary subtype, factors relating to the legislature (inter and intra-party conflict and legislative election loss) account for 43% of changes in the Prime Ministership in their sample of countries, compared to 76% for cases of the premier-presidential subtype (where only the legislature may remove the Prime Minister and cabinet). This shows that the President would have a key role in government appointment under this system.

Another key presidential power is the authority to unilaterally call binding referendums on "important issues which affect the higher interests of the country". Laws carried at such referendums are immune from constitutional review. This is a seemingly rare and extraordinary power for the President.

Miscellaneous Issues

A Supreme Constitutional Court is established, with judges chosen by the Constituent Assembly for renewable four-year terms. These terms are fairly short by international standards (France and Italy has nine-year terms, retirement at 70 for Australia and 75 in Canada, and judges of the US Supreme Court have life terms). Removal of judges can also be regulated by law, while it is more common for super-majorities of the legislature or other special procedures to be laid down for these judges.

The implementation of laws and the determination of policy is somewhat confusingly divided between the President (who "issues decrees, edicts and instructions in accordance with the Constitution and the law") and the Government (which "guides the work of ministries and public bodies" and "issues decisions and regulations").

Amendment of the Constitution can be done with 75% approval of both houses of the legislature and approval by the President. However, given that referendums initiated by the President are immune from constitutional review, this would appear to be the path of least resistance for de facto constitutional change.

Prospects for success

To say the least, the proposal has not been well-received by the existing armed opposition. It appears flawed in various ways for a post-conflict nation, but the key issue is its majoritarianism. No guarantee of regional autonomy is provided; it is still technically in the gift of the central government. 

More disconcertingly, the Constituent Assembly's composition is left entirely to law. Even were it to be initially chosen by elected regional governments, one party winning the Presidency and a majority in both houses could create weak, appointed regional government bodies and stack the Constituent Assembly (by legislating that it be appointed for long terms by the President, like the South African National Party did in 1955). The likelihood of such an occurrence would depend to some extent on the electoral system: the existing system is the multiple non-transferable vote, which can be highly majoritarian.

This proposal is an interesting contribution by the Russian Foreign Ministry to discussions for Syria's future. However, the document has the potential to create a top-heavy, powerful presidency, potentially filled by Mr Assad, which could create dissatisfaction amongst opponents of him and lead to future armed conflict. A better design for a post-conflict constitution would provide for more checks on this executive, such as a change to a premier-presidential system, entrenched power for regional governments, and a clearer outline for the composition of the Constituent Assembly.

France Presidency 2017

France is scheduled to hold the first round of elections to the Presidency on the 23rd of April; if no candidate receives a majority of votes in this round, a second round will be held, between the top two candidates in the first round, on the 7th of May. Elections to the National Assembly, the popularly elected and most powerful house of the bicameral legislature, are also scheduled to take place in June, roughly one month after the likely second round of the presidential election.

I've written before about France's electoral system, but it is worth summarising the nation's constitutional arrangements at present. France has a semi-presidential system of government, with both a directly-elected President for a five-year term and a Prime Minister responsible to the lower house of the bicameral legislature (the National Assembly). The system is of the premier-presidential sub-type, meaning that the Prime Minister cannot be removed by the President, though they may appoint a Prime Minister.

This election follows five years of the presidency of Francois Hollande, a Socialist. Mr Hollande was elected to the presidency, defeating the leader of the centre-right UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) after seventeen years of centre-right control of the office. Mr Hollande, however, has struggled with a stagnant economy and high unemployment, and did not choose to seek re-election. He leaves office with low approval ratings, and with a Socialist Party that lost substantial support in local and European elections during his tenure.

Candidates

Benoit Hamon-Socialist Party

The governing Socialist Party held an open primary to determine their presidential candidate. Voters were required to be registered to vote in normal French elections, to donate one euro to the organisation conducting the primary (while only Socialist candidates were likely to win, candidates from minor parties closely affiliated to the Socialists also competed, hence the primary was branded as the "Citizens' Primary"), and to generally accept the values of the left. 1.6 million votes were cast in the first round, a figure which increased to 2 million in the second.

The leading candidates for this primary were Manuel Valls, a former Prime Minister, and Arnaud Montebourg and Benoit Hamon, both former cabinet ministers. Valls, considered a more right-wing candidate than the other two, led in early polls, but the first round of the primary resulted in an unexpected first place for Mr. Hamon, who won 36% to 31% for Mr. Valls and 17% for Mr. Montebourg. No other candidate won more than 7%. Montebourg endorsed Hamon for the second round, who won 58% to 42% for Valls.

Hamon is considered to be on the left of the Socialists, supporting a policy of providing a basic income to all citizens and the legalisation of cannabis.

Francois Fillon-The Republicans

Like the Socialists, the Republicans (a re-brand of the UMP) held an open primary to determine their nominee, in which the general public could vote. The unpopularity of the incumbent Socialist government made it likely that the Republican nominee would have a good chance of victory; hence, there was more interest in the Republican primary. 4.3 million voters turned out in the second round, 4.4 in the second.

Also similar to the Socialists, there were three main candidates in this primary. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy and former Prime Ministers Alain Juppe and Francois Fillon. Mr Juppe was the front-runner, with most expecting the runoff to between him and Mr Sarkozy. However, after a strong debate performance, Fillon surged to 44% in the first round, with Juppe on 29%, Sarkozy on 21% and no other candidate above 3%. With Sarkozy endorsing Fillon, he won an easy victory in the second round with 66% of the vote.

The victory gave Fillon frontrunner status; given the divided nature of the left, it was considered likely that he would face National Front candidate Marine Le Pen in the second round. Ms Le Pen's radical views mean that Fillon would likely win such a runoff comfortably with leftist votes. However, in recent days, he has been beset by a scandal involving his wife being paid for an apparently 'fake job', and his polling has dropped accordingly. It remains to be seen whether he will remain in the race.

Emmanuel Macron-Independent/En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron served as economy minister for two years as a Socialist, but resigned from the position last year, after conflicts with party positions on various matters within his portfolio. He then launched a new political party, En Marche!, and ran for the presidency. He has also signalled his intention to run a slate of candidates for the National Assembly election. 

Initial polls had Macron in third place, behind Le Pen and Fillon. However, following the Fillon scandal, recent polls have shown him catching up to Fillon, and advancing to the second round, where he receives the support of the centre-right and beats Le Pen comfortably. He stands on a platform of economic liberalisation and general social liberalism, to the right of Hamon and perhaps Le Pen economically, but to the left of Fillon and Le Pen on issues like immigration. 

Marine Le Pen-National Front

The National Front are a long-term minor presence on the French political scene. The usage of the two-round system, where the centre-left and right generally team up against National Front candidates in the second round, has generally led to little representation for the party in the National Assembly. The party's most substantial result in the past was Le Pen's father, Jean Le Pen, reaching the second round in the 2002 presidential election, narrowly beating Socialist Lionel Jospin in a fragmented race. Mr Le Pen's opponent in this round, UMP incumbent Jacques Chirac, received the endorsement of Mr Jospin, and much of the left, propelling him to a landslide victory (82-18).

Mainstream opposition to the party comes from distaste of its opposition to immigration and Islam, however, with an increase in concern about terrorism and immigration after the Syrian refugee crisis, the party's stocks have risen. They won the highest number of votes at the 2014 European election, and have performed strongly at lower-level elections throughout Mr Hollande's term. It appears likely that Ms Le Pen will win the highest number of votes in the first round of the election, with roughly 24%; however, most polls have her losing a runoff by twenty points or more to Mr Macron or Fillon.

Other candidates in the race include leftist Jean-Luc Melanchon, running with the support of the Left Front (successor to the Communist Party), though his candidacy is under the name 'Unsubmissive France', Green candidate Yannick Jadot, Nicholas Dupont Aignan (who is attempting to fill the niche between Fillon and Le Pen), and various other irrelevancies. Melanchon is the strongest of this group, polling at around 10%. None of the others is higer than 3%. Centrist Francois Bayrou has not yet stated whether he will stand for the election; polls that include him show him at 5%.

Problems with the two-round system

The two-round system is one of those most commonly used for presidential elections around the world. Much of this is due to many presidential systems (such as those in Senegal and the Central African Republic) being in place due to French influence during colonial times, but the system is used in countries like the Ukraine and Poland because it ensures a candidate will be elected with majority support. 

Nonetheless, the system has a substantial disadvantage in fragmented elections, which we may see demonstrated in this upcoming vote. In a fragmented election, the possibility exists that two candidates can make it to the second round with little initial support. If an ideological group splits itself between too many candidates, the possibility exists that no candidate representing a substantial ideological group is able to enter the second round.

An example of this is shown in the 2002 presidential election. Red candidates represent leftists, blue conservatives, black far-right candidates and cyan centrists. As you can see, Chirac and Le Pen finished first and second, and all voters had to choose between them in the second round. However, 45% of voters, all up, voted for a leftist candidate, compared to 29% for the left and 19% for the far-right. Yet there was no candidate for the leftists in the second round, because of the increased fragmentation of this group.

The problem arises because the two-round system does not necessarily provide great incentives for voters to coalesce around two candidates. Left-inclined voters in 2002 may have felt comfortable knowing that they could cast a ballot for a minor leftist, to signify their support for that particular candidate, thinking that Jospin would certainly enter the second round. A first-past-the-post system would mean voters would coalesce between two candidates, at least in theory; often, this squashes diversity in the party system, or leads to candidates being elected with little support.

While Fillon's woes have made this possibility likely, it could potentially have been the case that the left, with the backing of roughly 40% of the electorate, would have had no representation in the runoff. This particular issue is partially circumvented for National Assembly elections, where candidates can enter the second round if they receive the support of 12.5% of the registered electorate (on average, this represented 21.8% of the vote cast at the last election). However, the Constitution of France specifically entrenches the top-two requirement for presidential elections.

Even so, one of the key advantages of preferential voting for single-member seats (as the Presidency of France is) is demonstrated by this particular alternative; the usage of several rounds of exclusions and transfers results in the candidates in later stages of the count having wider support than their equivalents under the two-round system.

The National Assembly

The President has the right, after 'consultation' with the Prime Minister and Speaker, to dissolve the National Assembly at any time of his choosing. However, the Assembly's maximum term is five years, meaning that an election must be held by the tenth of June this year. 

No doubt, such an election date would serve the victor of the election well. The popularity bump incumbent presidents receive has meant that the last three legislative elections, all held shortly after those for the Presidency, have resulted in majorities for the newly elected President's party, a useful tool given that failure to control the Assembly means the President loses control over the cabinet and becomes less able to pass their agenda.

This will become an especially important point in the case of a victory by Mr. Macron. His 'En Marche!' party, as a cursory examination of its website will show, spends much of its time discussing Macron's statements alone. He has said he will run candidates for all 477 seats, but the  gives the appearance of being a mainly personalistic vehicle, focusing on providing a brand to its lead candidate, far more than any other French party. The Socialist and Republican sites show statements from a variety of other figures, and both parties, despite their weaknesses at this election, do have large legislative caucuses and incumbent members with personal vote factors.

Normal behaviour has been for the centre-left and centre-right to form opposing alliances where they allocate seats to parties within said alliances, with the National Front generally not being able to make the second round in most seats due to this tactic (unlike the presidential elections); in 2012, they only entered the second round in sixty-five seats, and won two. If Macron wins, it may well be the case that he forms an agreement with the existing leftist alliance (Socialists+Greens) that would allow the Socialists to have some influence over the new government, while giving some experience and aforementioned personal vote factors to the President.

It is still largely unpredictable what will happen at these elections. Perhaps reflecting the irrelevance of such polling until the winner of the Presidency is determined, the most recent poll with seat numbers was taken in June 2016. It had the centre-right winning a majority, and the National Front winning around fifty seats (in normal two-round elections, they have never left single digits; this would be their best result for any National Assembly election). Such a result, which seems consistent with general increases in support for the FN at the local and European level (implying it's not just Ms Le Pen's personal support) would provide a clear reminder of that party's growing influence, even if Le Pen loses.

Victorian Electoral Reform-the problem, and what can be done

This post, like the previous one, is one on fairly parochial matters.

In my last post, I dealt with the issue of electoral reform in South Australia. While the reform proposed had its flaws, the South Australian state government is to be commended for at least making efforts to change the electoral system. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said for the state government of Victoria.

Victoria, like South Australia and Western Australia at present and the Federal Parliament up until this year, uses group tickets combined with the single transferable vote to elect its upper house of forty members. The criticisms I and others have made of group tickets in other jurisdictions apply for the most part here, though the rules in Victoria are somewhat different. In Victoria, each district, of which there are eight, elects five members for a four-year term. Votes above the line count as acceptance of that party's group ticket, and if voters wish to express their own preferences, they must vote below the line, for individual candidates. Victoria, unlike the other jurisdictions that use this system, allows voters to only number five boxes below the line.

Nonetheless, relatively few voters exercise this option. While the 8% rate is higher than that implemented at the federal level at recent elections, it is low enough to have little impact on the distribution of seats; while some might say that this reflects active voter support for party preference dealings, it does contrast notably with low follow rates for how-to-vote cards under the new system for the federal Senate. This suggests that voters may not be actively accepting the party deals, but perhaps rather being confused by the message from the federal Electoral Commission, still being promoted up to the last state election, that voters must number every box below the line.

In Victoria, the problem initially appeared less acute. At the first Legislative Council election under the aforementioned system, one member of the Democratic Labour Party was elected off 2.6% of the first preference vote from Labor, National, Family First and Country Alliance votes. The 2010 election saw this member defeated, with the lowest primary vote a party received a seat from being 11.7% for the Greens in Western Metropolitan.

However, at the most recent election, a total of nineteen parties contested at least one district, creating ample opportunities for preference swapping. This resulted in the election of several members with low initial support, as can be seen below.

District	Member	Party affiliation	Primary vote
Eastern Victoria	Jeffrey Bourman	Shooters and Fishers	2.44%
Northern Metropolitan	Fiona Patten	Sex Party	2.87%
Northern Victoria	Daniel Young	Shooters and Fishers	3.49%
Western Metropolitan	Rachel Carling-Jenkins	Democratic Labour	2.57%
Western Victoria	James Purcell	Vote 1 Local Jobs	1.29%

The above list shows the members elected with less than 25% of a quota (that is to say, less than about 4.15%). 

No personal judgement on these MPs should be considered when evaluating this system. It is safe to say that it is a relatively wide ideological cross-section. The issue here is whether they were fairly elected. 

Below is a list of where these candidates received their group ticket preferences from.

Member	Party	Group ticket votes from
Jeffrey Bourman	Shooters and Fishers	Australian Cyclists Party People Power Victoria/No Smart Meters Rise Up Australia Democratic Labour Party Australian Christians Family First Palmer United Party Sex Party Liberal Democrats
Fiona Patten	Sex Party	Voluntary Euthanasia Party Shooters and Fishers Liberal Democrats The Basics Rock’n’Roll Party Australian Greens Animal Justice Party Australian Cyclists Party
Daniel Young	Shooters and Fishers	People Power Victoria/No Smart Meters Palmer United Party Sex Party Australian Cyclists Party Liberal/National Coalition
Rachel Carling-Jenkins	Democratic Labour	Country Alliance Rise Up Australia Shooters and Fishers Party Australian Christians Voice for the West People Power Victoria/No Smart Meters Family First Liberal Democrats Liberal Party
James Purcell	Vote 1 Local Jobs	Country Alliance Family First Liberal/National Coalition Sex Party Democratic Labour Rise Up Australia People Power Victoria/No Smart Meters Australian Christians Liberal Democrats Shooters and Fishers

Some of these preference decisions may seem sufficiently democratic, like the libertarian Liberal Democrats, whose leader strongly supports liberalisation of gun laws, preferencing the Shooters and Fishers, or the Voluntary Euthanasia Party preferencing the Sex Party, which supports legalisation of euthanasia.

Others, however, are more questionable. For example, do voters for the Sex Party, which supports the legalisation of marijuana for recreational purposes, really want a Legislative Councillor from the Shooters and Fishers, whose NSW policy statement on the matter states that they want "increased education and information about the harmful effects of drugs together with police powers". The same preference decision was made for voters for the Cyclist Party. Or do voters from the Liberal Democrats want a Legislative Councillor from the Democratic Labour Party? These two parties have a whole host of policy differences, from free trade to same-sex marriage to foreign ownership of land. And yet the preferences of one went to the other.

The real question here is not whether these are the "right" decisions as determined by me. It is whether they are decisions that reflect the wishes of voters. Perhaps there are Liberal Democrats out there who want their next preferences to go to the Greens, or Sex Party voters who want their votes to go to the Shooters and Fishers. The current system, however, lets parties make these decisions through the group ticket system. 

A change to the federal system, where an above-the-line preference counts as only a preference for that party and where voters may cast as many or as few above-the-line preferences as they wish, would give this power back to the voters. If voters wish to make strange decisions, that is their prerogative, and that could result in members being elected with low primary vote shares. However, it is far less likely that this will happen under the new system, given that these artificially strong preference flows would not exist. 

Opponents of this change may argue that the federal system allows above-the-line votes to exhaust, if voters do not cast a preference for all candidates in the count. Nonetheless, the federal campaign to encourage voters to number at least six boxes worked successfully, suggesting that voters will cast preferences for more than one party. It is also worth noting that a vote exhausting may be a deliberate act; a voter may genuinely have no preference between further candidates.

Opponents may also argue that second candidates of parties are elected with low vote totals are regularly elected with low primary votes. Nonetheless, in terms of voter consent for the election of these members, this is a quite different matter. A person voting above-the-line for the Labor Party under the federal Senate system can clearly see exactly the candidates to which that vote will go; if the group ticket system is used, they would have to consult the long and complex list of group ticket preferences in order to determine where that vote will go. Hence a candidate elected on intraparty preferences under the federal Senate system has greater consent than one elected on interparty group tickets.

What can you do?

This is very much a section for Victorian consumption only.

The Andrews Government does not appear to have made public statements or introduced any legislation in support of repealing group ticket voting for any sort of replacement. This may reflect apparent ideological opposition to the change, as demonstrated by federal Labor, or mere unwillingness to irritate members of the crossbench required to pass legislation. Nonetheless, the South Australian Labor Party's proposal halfway through their term suggests that it can be done.

International Elections does not normally encourage readers to engage in political activity. But if you've read what I've written, and want to show your support for a change to the electoral system, there are a couple of things you can do. You can contact your MP (a tool for finding your electorate and contact details for MPs is here, click on your district than 'View Member' to see contact details) to show your concern and support for change. I have written a basic template for such a communication here.

It is worth noting that if you have limited time, the most important MPs to contact on such an issue would be from the Labor Party, given that their support is necessary to pass a bill through the lower house. A personal email to my local Australian Greens MLC has established their support for change, so you don't really have to bother with them.

If you wish to take this further, I am circulating a petition to the Legislative Council, that I hope to present through an MP. A copy of this petition is available here; if you wish to circulate it for signatures, please contact me (on Twitter, or by email in my Blogger profile on the sidebar) for details of where you can return it. Please note that signatures may only be presented if they are physically on the specific paper template, thanks to the antiquated rules the Victorian Parliament sets out for presentation of the petition.

Do South Australian voters get a Rau deal from the 'Voter Choice' Bill?

On 16 November this year, South Australian Attorney General John Rau introduced a bill into the House of Assembly (the lower house of South Australia's bicameral Parliament) to change the electoral system used to elect members of the Legislative Council. At present, members of the 22-member Legislative Council are elected eleven at a time for eight year terms; half face election at each election for the House of Assembly, the members of which serve four-year terms.

These elections use the single transferable vote system in one statewide district. However, the system has an important modification. Voters can either vote for one party ticket, which accepts an ordering of all the candidates in the election determined by that party and lodged with the Electoral Commission ahead of the election, or number every candidate in order of their preference. I have written about the severe flaws of this system in the past when used at the federal level, and many of the same criticisms apply to the South Australian system.

What the proposal means

If the bill is passed, South Australian voters will be faced with the same ballot paper (reproduced below) that they have received at past elections. However, the law changes substantially the functions of the above-the-line box.

South Australian Legislative Council sample ballot paper (Source: Government of South Australia 2011)

Under the current system, a vote like the one on the sample paper above would have been considered an adoption of the ranking of all the candidates that was submitted to the Electoral Commission before the election. Group C might have asked that an ATL vote for them next go to the candidates of Group A, then Group D, then B and E.

The new system changes the meaning of this vote. Now it only goes to the candidates of Group C. If all the candidates of Group C are excluded, the vote then exhausts. More importantly, voters may only cast one first preference above the line. So even if the voter voted 1 for Group C and 2 for Group A, the vote would only go to the candidates of Group C, and then exhaust. If a voter wishes to express preferences across party lines, they must vote below the line; the law creates a savings provision so that a first preference for the first candidate within a party group counts as an above-the-line vote for that party.

How would this work in practice? Well, the STV system initially allocates seats to candidates who receive a Droop quota ((votes/seats+1)+1). Once no candidate has a Droop quota, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is excluded, and their preferences. However, given that most South Australians vote above-the-line (96% at the last election), and that all above-the-line votes will immediately exhaust when their party does, this will mean that the exclusions will have a very minor impact, and it is most likely that the candidates which have the highest vote share after the process of allocating seats to candidates with Droop quotas will fill those final seats.

In effect, this means that the electoral system will be very much similar to the 'largest-remainder' method of party-list proportional representation. Each elected candidate within a party will receive exactly a quota of that party's vote before being elected, and the last candidate will receive the rest of that party's vote (the remainder).

How would it work?

It's worth noting that the largest-remainder system is designed to produce a generally proportional outcome, so the Legislative Council will likely continue to have a more proportional composition than the House of Assembly, which is elected in single-member districts using the single transferable vote. This means that the chamber can still fulfil its role as a check upon the powers of the Assembly; it may reject legislation, but cannot remove the government.

Nonetheless, the system will switch emphasis from attracting preferences to entirely attracting first preference votes. It would also cause a small change in the composition of the current Legislative Council, as can be seen below.

Party	Elected in 2010	Elected in 2014	Total	Change from GTV
Labor	4	4	8	0
Liberal	5	4	9	+1
Nick Xenophon Team	0	2	2	+1
Greens	1	1	2	0
Family First	1	0	1	-1
Dignity for Disability	0	0	0	-1

The Dignity for Disability Party won their seat in 2010 off preferences from other small parties, their first preference vote being only 1.2%. The new system would have given that seat to the Liberal Party. Family First won a seat off 4.3% of the primary vote and preferences from other parties; the new system would make that 0.52 quotas, to 1.55 for the Xenophon Team. It is possible that the new system could increase the number of below-the-line votes and make preferences a factor, hence giving that seat to Family First.

Michael Gallagher's 1992 paper on the subject of different methods of party-list proportional representation discusses effective thresholds for winning seats under these methods. He concludes that the threshold of exclusion; that is to say, the minimum number of votes a party can receive without securing a seat (adding one to this total will guarantee that party a seat) for the Droop quota and largest remainder system is 1/(s+1), where s is the number of seats to be allocated (this is in percentage terms). For South Australian elections, that would be equal to 8.33% of the vote. 

Distinct from this is the threshold of representation; that is to say, the smallest number of votes a party can receive and still receive a seat. For this particular figure, the equation is 2/(p(s+1)), where s is seats, and p is the number of competing parties. At the last election, this would be equal to 0.64% of the vote. A more general threshold equation, 75%/(s+1), gives a figure of 6.25%. 

Wasted votes

One advantage of the current STV system is that nearly all votes do go to an elected candidate. Given that a candidate must receive one quota to be elected, and the quota is (votes/(seats+1)+1), only enough candidates to fill all the seats may receive quotas; hence, the maximum number of votes that do not end up with an elected candidate cannot be more than votes/(seats+1) (8.33%).

The new system, however, would be more likely to disregard a larger number of votes. If we consider a vote that is not part of a quota or a remainder rewarded with a seat 'wasted', for my analysis of the last state election, 16.4% of all votes would be wasted, compared to the 8.3% of the vote left with candidates not elected in the actual election. These figures are relatively consistent for recent elections.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, to some extent, the current system lowers this figure to an unrealistic amount if voter preferences are to be legitimately consulted. If group voting tickets are to be done away with, getting this figure of only a quota wasted would require voters to cast a preference for every candidate or party group. This would lead to a high informal rate; when voters were required to preference every candidate for the federal Senate, informal rates larger than 10% were not uncommon. Usage of the federal Senate system, which has optional above-the-line preferences and potentially allows votes to exhaust, would increase this figure.

Labor's hypocrisy on exhausted votes

The South Australian Labor government's willingness to tolerate high exhaustion rates contrasts interestingly with Federal Labor's conduct during the debate over introducing optional preferential above-the-line voting. Labor opposed the changes, which passed nonetheless with support from the Greens and Nick Xenophon, on several grounds. One of them was the claim, made by South Australian Senator Penny Wong, that "It (the reform) will mean the votes of up to three million voters effectively going in the bin" and "disenfranchises more than three million voters—people who, at the last election, chose to vote for someone other than the major parties or the Greens". 

Ignoring, of course, what a load of nonsense these predictions were proven to be, I find it quite remarkable that the party that found it so undemocratic that above-the-line votes could exhaust is now introducing a system that guarantees above-the-line votes will exhaust.

 Why the state Labor government is not simply copying the federal system is somewhat confusing, and introducing preferences would improve on this proposal substantially. Nonetheless, the proposal does give voters certainty that their votes will count for their explicit choices only, and the value of preferences under GTV are very much questionable if preferences do not flow the way a voter wishes.

As always, Kevin Bonham has an excellent take on the matter, if you wish to read further.