Showing posts with label Pacific. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pacific. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 19, 2016

The Butler-Palmer proposal for a New Zealand constitution

Unlike most nations of the world, New Zealand does not have a written constitution. The process of how its government is appointed is governed by ordinary legislation; specifically, the Constitution Act 1986. However, unlike most constitutions, this legislation is not specially entrenched; nor can courts check the validity of legislation against it, since Parliament is considered the supreme body for national legislation. This system is inherited from the United Kingdom, which has a similar constitutional system.

Some opponents of this system claim that it provides little protection for individual liberties (New Zealand's 'Bill of Rights Act' has no validity in the courts), and that it makes the Constitution difficult for ordinary citizens to understand. It was these reasons in particular that appear to have encouraged former Labour Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer and constitutional lawyer Dr. Andrew Butler to write a draft of a potential New Zealand entrenched Constitution. The document is available here.

The Constitution contains some interesting ideas, though it is mostly relatively gradual change from New Zealand's current constitutional system. At the moment, New Zealand has a unicameral parliament, elected by mixed-member proportional representation. A government is chosen by, and responsible to, this Parliament. All of these features would be preserved, and strengthened in the case of the electoral system. Nonetheless, changes are made to some parts of the nation's constitutional structure. The largest one of these is the abolition of the monarchy.

Republic of New Zealand

The first parts of the Constitution lay out the most immediate and substantial change; the replacement of the monarchy, with the Queen of New Zealand (who, coincidentally, is also the Queen of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Jamaica...) represented by the Governor-General with a Republic. Under the current system, the Queen appoints a Governor-General (by convention, the Governor-General is a non-partisan figure appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister of the day) who then appoints a Prime Minister (generally the leader of the party or parties with majority support in the Parliament).

Under the new system, the Parliament would elect, every five years, a 'Head of State'. It is specifically stated that MPs would have a free vote on this matter, though MPs may still follow party lines on this matter in the hope of gaining a more influential position within the party. This Head of State has the formal power to appoint a Prime Minister, though under the new system they can only appoint the candidate elected by Parliament. They appoint Ministers, though this is on the advice of the Prime Minister only. The same condition applies to the Head of State's power to issue writs for parliamentary elections, to appoint ambassadors, and to promulgate legislation.

Regardless of what my readers may think about the virtues of republicanism, one potentially concerning issue exists with the manner in which legislation is promulgated. Laws passed by the House go to the Head of State for signature. In deciding whether to give approval to legislation, the Head of State must act "on advice from the Prime Minister and Attorney-General". This could potentially mean that Parliament's ability to legislate over the head of the Government could be jeopardised, given that the Prime Minister could simply advise the Head of State to veto legislation that Parliament had passed without his support.

This could be more of an issue in New Zealand's political system. Mixed-member proportional representation means that one party has never had an absolute majority in the House, and as such governments are dependent on support from other parties, perhaps with different ideologies. Were these other parties to disagree with the policies of the government, and were they to attempt to vote with the opposition on a bill, the senior government party, with a minority of seats, could simply veto that bill.

Of course, the general response would be that while New Zealand's (and Australia's) Governors-General have had authority to refuse assent to legislation, they have never done so by convention. This is true, but the Australian Constitution and the New Zealand 'Constitution'  do not include the requirement for the Governor-General to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, and thus the convention would be changed.

A better way of putting this would be to either give the power of promulgating legislation to the Speaker of the House  (as in Papua New Guinea), or to allow the Parliament to override the decision of the Head of State by simple majority and either require them to assent to the legislation (as in Morocco) or allow the Speaker of the House to do so (as in the former Kingdom of Laos). The Head of State could also be simply required to sign the legislation. Any one of these solutions would work just as well as the other, but one should be adopted to ensure Parliament is able to act as a law-making body.

Choosing a Government

The present system of choosing a Prime Minister by the Governor-General appointing the person who has the confidence of the House would be replaced under the new Constitution. Under the new system, the Parliament elects a Prime Minister from amongst its members. The Prime Minister must have majority support from the Parliament, which I take to mean that the Prime Minister would be elected by exhaustive ballot (MPs vote for candidates, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is excluded, a further round takes place amongst the remaining candidates. This process repeats until one candidate has a majority. The candidate who has a majority is then appointed by the Head of State as Prime Minister.

This method of appointing a Prime Minister is quite common in the Pacific region. Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, Nauru (though this is for the combined Head of State and Head of Government, titled the President) and Tuvalu all 'elect' their Prime Minister in this way. In theory, the system acts the same as the method used in other Commonwealth countries of appointment by the Sovereign; in both cases, the Prime Minister should have majority support in the parliament. However, it does provide some clarity to the process. Attempts to use the method of appointment by the Sovereign in countries that are more politically fractured, such as Nigeria, resulted in political violence and extended litigation; even in Australia, the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975 represented a case where the powers of the Sovereign were used in a controversial manner.

In this case, then, this represents a very minor change to existing practice in New Zealand. Nonetheless, it would appear to be sensible to take powers away from a Head of State who is meant to "endeavour to act as a non-partisan symbol of unity"; even more so when that leader is chosen for a fixed term by a simple majority of Parliament.  As is normal practice, the Head of State would then appoint a Cabinet, on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Fixed terms of Parliament, for four years, are established. Early elections may be held if three-quarters of Parliament vote for them, or if a majority of MPs vote no confidence in the Government and no new government receives a vote of confidence for fourteen days. This does give the option, for a government wishing an early election, of faking a vote of no confidence in itself and using its majority to block formation of a new government. Nonetheless, this tactic could not be effectively blocked without making it impossible for Parliament to be dissolved in case of a severe deadlock.

Parliament

The Parliament remains unicameral, and most features are again simply the current practice in New Zealand, but codified. The mixed-member proportional representation system is specified as the means by which Parliament is elected, meaning that it cannot be changed without a Constitutional amendment.

Certain parliamentary offices are specified in the Constitution. The Leader of the House, the Opposition Leader, and the Finance Minister are all in the document, with their roles vaguely outlined. This appears to be an attempt not so much to entrench these offices (which have existed in NZ since the evolution of the modern party despite not being in the Constitution) as to make the Constitution more effective in describing how government operates in the country. A committee system is also entrenched. The committees are given the right to propose legislation, and ministers are prohibited from serving on most of them.

Various other financial offices are entrenched, such as the office of the Auditor-General and the Reserve Bank, which is tasked with "formulating and implementing monetary policy designed to promote stability in the general level of prices" and "promoting the maintenance of a sound and efficient financial system".

Rights and Freedoms

Of course, the main goal of this constitution is to create some rights and freedoms against which legislation can be checked. Oddly enough, this section is towards the ending of the document, a rarity when a Constitution has a bill of rights planned out at drafting (the US's rights and freedoms provisions are towards the end, but they were not put in when the Constitution is written); the only example I can immediately think of is Rhodesia, and those were not strictly rights and freedoms (given that they were qualified to the moon, and were not judicially enforceable anyway).

The rights provided are quite broad, including freedom of expression, the right to privacy, freedom from discrimination on a wide variety of bases, freedom of religion, and rights to a fair trial. These rights, however "may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". This gives some leeway for the government to qualify these rights, though is not uncommon in rights and freedoms provisions around the world. It is also obviously stronger than the current wholly unenforceable Bill of Rights.

Some more rights are provided in the economic area. Free education to the secondary level is guaranteed, and the government is also required to protect the environment (this, as far as I can tell, would be enforceable through the courts). A series of principles for economic policy are laid out, including rights to an "adequate standard of living", social security, and satisfactory health and safety conditions in employment. These principles are explicitly not enforceable through the courts.

The police and intelligence agencies are both specifically mentioned in this section. Both set out that activities of these agencies must be limited by law. Information collected by the security agencies must be approved by a warrant from a 'judicial officer'. Precisely why this provision exists when the right "not to be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with that person’s privacy, family, home or correspondence" is unclear; one would assume that, were judicial review to be robust, the courts
would establish guidelines for surveillance.

Other sections

Local government is entrenched in the Constitution, though with no specific powers being granted; rather, a series of principles for its organisation are set out. The office of an Ombudsman is mandated, as is a requirement that official information "must be made available to the greatest extent practicable".

Amendment of the Constitution is done by a vote of three-quarters of Parliament; quite a high threshold by international standards. The US requires a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress (and ratification from three-quarters of the states) and India requires two-thirds of both houses and half the states: closer in the region, Vanuatu requires two-thirds of Parliament, and Papua New Guinea requires two-thirds as well, while Australia requires a majority in both houses and passage at a referendum by a majority of voters both nationwide and in at least four States. Back in NZ, a referendum is then required, with a majority of votes sufficient to pass the referendum (this is how I interpreted the provision; it does not state specifically that both are required, or that only one is).

An extra provision is added for legislation that is invalidated by the courts for incompatibility with the Constitution. This legislation may be 'validated', and hence considered to be in accordance with the Constitution, if a law to that effect is passed by three-quarters of Parliament (but no referendum). For a Constitution where much effort appears to have been put into making it easy to understand, such a provision would seem to hide amendments to the document in hard-to-find pieces of legislation.

One of the most interesting, and as far as I know unique, provisions is the requirement that a Constitutional Commission be held every ten years. This Commission is to be composed of six law officers (the Clerk of Parliament, the Chief Justice, the Ombudsman etc.) and six lucky members of the public. It is tasked with investigating amendments to the Constitution, and reporting to Parliament on the matter.

In general, the Butler-Palmer proposal has substantial merit for protection of human rights, as compared to their current protections, and for making the governing process clear. Nonetheless, in an effort to reach this goal some of the provisions appear too vague, while others seem even redundant. This could lead to difficulties when legislation went before the courts. In order for the document to be effective, clarity and specificity should be placed above educational value. The remainder of the document represents effective codification of current practices, though with some questionable changes involved in the process of transition to a republic.

Monday, May 2, 2016

Elected prime ministerial government in Kiribati

This post was also posted at Fruits and Votes

One of the rarer forms of government in the world is elected prime ministerial government. Under this system of government, a head of government is directly elected by the voters, but can be removed from office by a majority of members of the legislature. If the elected Prime Minister is removed from office, new elections are held to choose a new Prime Minister and (in some cases) legislature.

The system was most notably used in Israel from 1996 to 2001. It was criticised there for leading to party fragmentation in the legislature (by disconnecting the office of Prime Minister from the legislative elections, while still making the Prime Minister have a majority in said legislature), and leading to more elections and less stable government. As you can see, it was quickly removed, and most publications state it is not used anywhere else in the world. However, it still exists; in the small Pacific nation and former British colony of Kiribati.

Under the Kiribati Constitution, the office of Beretiteni (President) is directly elected, using first-past-the-post. The President appoints ministers from the unicameral legislature (elected using the two-round system), which does not require parliamentary approval. Not unusually for the Pacific Islands, the Attorney-General has a specifically defined role in the Constitution, and I believe holds a legislative seat automatically because of his office.

However, section 2 of article 33 states 

(2) The Beretitenti shall cease to be Beretitenti-

(a) if he resigns his office, by notice in writing addressed to the Speaker; 

(b) if a motion of no confidence in the Beretitenti or the Government is supported in the Maneaba ni Maungatabu by the votes of a majority of all the members of the Maneaba; 

(c) if, in respect of any matter before the Maneaba, the Beretitenti notifies the Speaker that a vote on that matter raises an issue of confidence, and in a subsequent vote on that matter it is rejected by a majority of all the members of the Maneaba;

 (d) if he ceases to be a member of the Maneaba otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the Maneaba


If, under the provisions of 2a, the Beretiteni is removed from office, the Council of State (a body consisting of the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Speaker of the legislature, and the Chief Justice) takes office. 

This is where article 78 kicks in.

78. (1) The Maneaba ni Maungatabu (legislature) shall stand dissolved- 

(a) if a motion of no confidence in the Beretitenti or the Government is supported in the Maneaba by the votes of a majority of all the members of the Maneaba; or

(b) if, in respect of any matter before the Maneaba, the Beretitenti notifies the Speaker that a vote on that matter raises an issue of confidence, and in a subsequent vote on that matter it is rejected by a majority of all the members of the Maneaba. 

As I read it, this would rule out a change in government as a result of a no-confidence vote, as such a vote would automatically dissolve the legislature.

Following a general election, a ballot for Beretiteni is automatically scheduled. The Constitution stipulates that

The Maneaba (legislature) shall after the election of the Speaker nominate, from among members of the Maneaba, not less than 3 nor more than 4 candidates for election as Beretitenti, and no other person may be a candidate

Ordinary legislation is used to govern this election. As far as I can tell, the Borda count was used up to 2002, with voters being allowed to number only four candidates. However, in 2002, the legislation was amended (due to Borda being "complicated" and easy to manipulate)  to have a rather unusual variant of the two-round system. In the first round, the two candidates with the most votes are declared nominated for the Presidency, while in the second round all other candidates are voted on; the top two of these are declared nominated.

Kiribati is unusually stable for a Pacific Island country. Since independence in 1979, there have been only five Beretitenis (excluding leaders of the Council of State who took an interim role in government) compared to eleven Prime Ministers of Vanuatu since 1980 and eight Prime Ministers of Fiji since 1983.

It also has a party system, though it is fairly weak. The Elections Ordinance makes no mention of political parties (except in a section prohibiting advertising from parties in a perimeter around the polling station); however, election results suggest that a substantial number of MPs are affiliated with political parties, as are Presidential candidates. What is confusing about the parties is that the literature I have read suggests that they nominated multiple candidates for the Presidency, which seems like very odd behaviour for a political party.

The first President to lose the confidence of the legislature was Ieremia Tabai. He was re-elected as President in 1982, but without a legislative majority aligned to him. By making a minor bill a matter of confidence, he was able to dissolve the legislature, with opposition MPs apparently going along unsure of the consequences. The result was Tabai's re-election, and a much more compliant legislature.

Tabai's successors, Teato Teannaki, was removed by a vote of no-confidence, and did not run in the 1994 election. His successor, Teburoto Tito, lasted longer, winning three elections, but a poor result by his party in the legislative elections of 2002 meant that his narrow 2003 victory was swiftly followed by a no-confidence vote. In the elections held later in 2003, the Pillars of Truth party won 16 out of 41 seats, to 14 for the Protect the Maneaba. The remaining seats were won by candidates not affiliated to one of the parties. The following Presidential elections saw Pillars of Truth candidate Anote Tong win, narrowly.

Tong was elected two more times, serving his full term both times. His Pillars of Truth party was the largest party in both elections, though without a majority. However, the fairly fluid party system meant that he was able to avoid no-confidence votes.

At the last election, Tong was term-limited (only three terms are allowed), and he was replaced by Taneti Maamau. He is a member of the Tobwaan Kiribati Party. I am not sure how the legislative seats were distributed; IPU gives this group 19 seats to 26 for Pillars of Truth; however, this figure looks like it redistributed independents to the two parties. Either way, the figure suggests that Maamau does not have especially strong support in the legislature.

So, where does this odd constitutional arrangement come from? Well, in preparation for independence, the colonial governor of Kiribati arranged a Constitutional Convention, comprised of 165 members from different parts of the county which he appointed, in order to design a more appropriate constitution. While this was met with protest within certain circles of the British colonial administration, most of the decisions of the convention were adapted in the constitution.

The goal of having an elected President appears to have been to create a figure above parochial local politics, a worthy aim, especially in the Pacific. No-confidence votes leading to elections also might give MPs pause for thought, and lead them to consider negotiation before toppling the President. While I am unsure to what extent Kiribati's constitutional model has led to its relative stability, it is certainly worth a look for other Pacific states.

Note: Information for this post was sourced from the second volume of Nohlen's Elections in Asia and the Pacific as well as Atoll Politics: The Republic of Kiribati edited by Howard Van Trease and Politics in Kiribati edited by Taomati Iuta

Monday, January 11, 2016

Vanuatu 2015

Vanuatu is a small nation in the Pacific Ocean, with a population of 200,000-300,000. Like most nations in the region, it is spread across various islands, and is ethnically varied. In recent years, it has suffered from a variety of natural disasters, which has left it relatively poor.

The islands were first discovered by the Portuguese, who thought it was Australia. Finding out that it was smaller than they expected, they left. It was rediscovered in 1768 by Louis Bougainville (a French explorer), and was also visited by James Cook in 1774, who named it the New Hebrides (the old Hebrides being cold and damp Scottish islands). These two explorers represented the two conflicting interests on the island.

The islands attracted colonists from both countries, because of its fertile land which was suitable for growing a wide variety of crops. With increasing population, however, came increasing conflict between the two countries. In 1907, the British and French finally agreed to form a joint government, called a Condominium. This formalised the arrangements of having two separate government systems, with both government systems being overseen by appointed Commissioners: one commissioner coming from the French, and one from the British. No legislative body was established.

It took until 1957 for an Advisory Council to be established, which would be comprised of 16 members. There would be four appointed members from each ethnic group (four French, four British and four indigenous). The Treasurer and Commissioner of Public Works (one French, one British) would also sit on this council, as well as both Commissioners. This Council had purely an advisory role, and did not sit especially often.

In 1964, a number of changes were made to the second Advisory Council. Four of the indigenous members were elected by Local Councils (I cannot tell whether these were elected or not), and four of the European members were elected by the Chamber of Commerce. The 1969 Advisory Council was elected in a similar manner, but with four extra indigenous members.

Controversies over European usage of land led to increases in nationalist sentiment amongst the indigenous population. Both colonial partners therefore made steps towards making the islands independent, though the British were more enthusiastic about independence than the French. A pro-independence party, called the New Hebrides National Party, was formed, and led sometimes violent protests against the Condominium. It was viewed as having more pro-British views.

The French were still antagonistic to movements for greater autonomy. However, the election of
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, considered a liberal, as President of France, as well as the formation of Francophone political parties in favour of autonomy, eventually led to the French agreeing to the establishment of a directly elected Representative Assembly with 'new powers'; however, at the meeting of ministers in late 1974 that agreed to this, a statement was issued saying that "there was no indication of the New Hebrides becoming independent yet".

The electoral system for this assembly was a topic for much debate. There were two Francophone parties, but only one Anglophone party. This meant that under a single-member (or, indeed, multi-member) plurality system, the Anglophone party would be advantaged, as the Francophone vote would be split.

As a result, the single non-transferable vote was adopted, with a district magnitude between one and six (although it appears that special arrangements applied in the Port Vila and Santo districts; see below). This appears to be more out of ignorance of proportional alternatives and a desire for simplicity (single non-transferable vote is more of an East Asian electoral system, and is not used in either Britain or France) than out of a desire to place the traditions of the colonial powers into the political system. 

One concession to French tradition (although, as before, this appears to be more out of a desire for simplicity) was the usage of a ballot and envelope system, where voters receive a ballot for each candidate (which was printed with party names, symbols and a photograph of the candidate), place one in an envelope, and put that envelope in the ballot box.

Other than the 29 directly elected members, there would be six members elected from the Chamber of Commerce, three members from indigenous co-operative societies, and four tribal chiefs. While there was no ethnic voting in most districts, the urban districts of Port Vila and Luganville had ethnic quotas (2 each for the British, French and indigenous in Port Vila and one for each group in Luganville) and for a vote to be formal, it had to be cast for one candidate in each ethnic group.

This would violate the principle of SNTV, but I don't know if those principles were kept. Indeed, judging by the vaguely reported results from the Luganville council election (18-1 seat win for an anti-National alliance off slightly more than 50%, with only one district), I would suspect this is a case of multiple non-transferable vote, and that voters had as many votes as there were seats to be filled.

Elections to the Representative Assembly took place in November 1975, and were staggered over the month. The final result of the directly elected districts was seventeen for the National Party, ten for the francophone conservative Union of Communities of the New Hebrides (UCNH) and two for the alliance of Nagriamel, a traditionalist party based on the island of Espiritu Santo and the Movement for the Autonomies of the New Hebrides (MANH), another Francophone conservative party.

With a substantial number of co-operative and chief members supporting the National Party, it looked likely that the Nationals would win a majority. However, the loss of a seat in a by-election caused by the annulment of an election meant that they did not have a majority. Election arrangements for the Representative Assembly were chaotic, and a number of members could not be elected.

Pro-independence sentiment gained steam, and in 1977, it was agreed that independence had to happen. A referendum on the subject was scheduled for 1980, with independence to follow directly after.  The elections of the year were boycotted by the Vanua'aku Party (the renamed Nationals), and the Francophone conservative parties won all of the seats unopposed.

Nonetheless, independence was prepared for, and a Constitution needed to be drawn up. This constitution established a parliamentary system of government, with a unicameral parliament. The Parliament would have a four-year term, but could be dissolved by the President on advice of the Cabinet or by majority vote of parliament.

The President of the nation would hold a mostly ceremonial role, as executive power was formally vested in the Prime Minister and Cabinet. He or she would be elected by an electoral college comprised of the Parliament and the leaders of the local council. The Prime Minister would be elected by Parliament, and he or she would be able to appoint ministers. No-confidence motions were not constructive. Amendment of the Constitution would require a two-thirds vote of parliament, except changes to the electoral, parliamentary and language systems.

Following the adoption of the Constitution (although it would not be in place until independence in 1980), an election was held to what would be the Parliament after independence. The result was a decisive win for the VP, which won 62.3% of the vote and 26 of 39 seats. The Moderate party won 10.9% and 5 seats, the Federal Party won 7.1% and two seats, and independents won 8.1% and two seats. Other seats, along with the named parties, were won by parties mostly opposed to the VP. However, the VP won a majority, and seems to have been able to declare independence without a referendum.

Independence did not go entirely smoothly, however. Francophones and supporters of the Moderate Party attempted to secede from the new Republic of Vanuatu, while the Nagriamel movement, with the support of the libertarian Phoenix Foundation and the Francophone political parties on the island, declared indepedence for the island of Santo. These rebellions were quashed by Papua New Guinean troops, though.

With independence approved, George Sokomanu, a VP member, was elected President. The office of Prime Minister, where most of the power was concentrated, was taken by Walter Lini, another VP member. The VP, however, was not especially unified; during this first parliament, a number of ministers were sacked from their positions. In fact, three members of the VP, including two former ministers, resigned from the party out of dissatisfaction with Lini's leadership, though this party's support was still relatively weak (it only won 5.6% in a Luganville by-election in 1982). Indeed, the opposition was even weaker, and some of its MPs were ineligible to attend parliamentary sittings.

The first elections under independence took place in November 1983. The Independent Alliance teamed up with the Union of Moderate Parties, the conservative Francophone group (UMP) in some manner, but to no avail. The VP won 24 seats to 12 for the UMP, and one seat each for three minor moderate parties. As is important under a SNTV system, the VP were very effective at dividing their vote, and they only missed out on one seat due to poor vote division. Lini was re-elected as Prime Minister.

The next election took place in 1987. These were considered to be a more competitive election, following leadership  in the VP caused by Prime Minister Lini having a stroke in that year. The nation's economy was performing poorly, too, with GDP contracting by 2.9% in that year and inflation reaching 16.4%. While a number of other parties contested the election, including the National Democratic Party (which was a split from the VP) it was considered to be a two-party contest between the VP and UMP.

During the campaign, the UMP attacked what they said was a failure of the VP to combat the recession, while the VP attacked alleged connections between the French government and the UMP. The result was a significant loss for the VP. While they did win 25 seats, which is a gain of one on paper, Parliament's size had increased by seven, meaning that their share of seats went down from 61% to 54%. This left the government with a two-seat majority. The UMP won 19 seats, a gain of seven. This presented them as a serious opposition to the government.

Their election victory, however, was not the end of the VP's woes. Prime Minister Lini was weakened by his stroke, and party secretary-general Barak Sope decided to challenge him for the party leadership. A party congress in December 1987 re-elected Lini party leader 59-29 against Sope. In an attempt to mend fences, Sope was given a cabinet portfolio.

In an attempt to reduce Sope's power, the government abolished the urban land management authority which gave Sope substantial influence. This led to substantial riots against the decision from landowners, in May 1988, which led to Sope being sacked from the cabinet by Lini.

In July 1988, Prime Minister Lini requested that the Speaker sack Sope and four other members of Parliament who supported him. Under Vanuatu law, MPs can be sacked if they leave their parties. Lini claimed that the five were expelled from the VP, and were thus eligible to be sacked. Four days later, after the UMP MPs had boycotted Parliament, Lini also asked the Speaker to remove them from Parliament, under legislation that allows MPs that stay away from their seats for three or more days to be sacked. This left only Lini's VP MPs left in Parliament, after the Supreme Court rejected an appeal against the decision made by the sacked MPs.

Lini, in an attempt to fill the seats, called by-elections for December 12 of that year. However, in October, his plans were somewhat derailed by an appeals court reinstating Sope and his four supporters as members of Parliament. However, shortly after, the five formally resigned. They had joined a new political party, led by Sope, called the Melanisian Progressive Party (MPP).

The by-elections went ahead, though, with the MPP and UMP boycotting. In the end, the VP won most of the seats, some unopposed, thus placing them in a massively dominant position in the new Parliament.

December 16, however, saw a surprising intervention by President Sokomanu, who announced that he would dissolve the parliament, swear in an interim government led by Sope and UMP leader Maxime Carlot, and hold elections in February. Lini reacted quickly: he sought a judgement from the Supreme Court, which declared Sokomanu's actions to be unconstitutional. Members of the interim government, as well as president Sokomanu, appeared before the courts on charges of administering unlawful oaths.

Various members of the interim government were arrested, and trialled on charges of sedition. The President himself was removed by the Electoral College on January 12. He was replaced by Fred Timikata, Lini's Minister for Health, who won 41 out of 42 votes. Now ex-president Sokomanu was placed on trial, and sentenced to six years in prison, while Sope and Carlot received five years each. The VP were now in a dominant position, and Lini was head of the party.

However, Lini himself was not too dominant. He dismissed his Health Minister, Donald Kalpokas, who promptly left the government and led a no-confidence motion against him. Kalpokas became Prime Minister, but at the cost of Lini forming a new party, the National United Party (NUP) with the support of 20 VP MPs.

The election saw three factions of the VP contesting: the actual party, under the leadership of PM Kalpokas, the NUP, under the leadership of Lini, and the MPP, under the leadership of Sope with the support of Sokomanu. Compared to this, the UMP was unified, and it was therefore no surprise that they came first, although without a majority.


The MPP polled poorly, and worse than expected, while the UMP won the most seats by a substantial margin. The VP and NUP polled roughly equally. The substantial bonus for the UMP suggests tactical nomination, and that is also suggested by the fact that 61% of UMP candidates were successful, compared to 37% of VP candidates, 30% of UMP candidates and 17% of MPP candidates; this would suggest over-nomination on the part of the MPP.

The most interesting thing about this election is the dramatic increase in the number of parties. The best mechanism for testing this is the effective number of parties, which roughly measures how many parties there would be if all the parties were of the same size. The 1987 election had an effective number of parties in terms of seats of 2.14 and an effective number of parties in terms of votes of 2.59. This increased to 3.65 and 4.7 respectively, which represents a small but notable increase.

The coalition government formed was comprised of the UMP and NUP, with Maxime Carlot as Prime Minister and NUP member Sethy Regenvanu as deputy. The split between the two parties of 7-4 was proportional to their parliamentary support. Walter Lini did not join the cabinet, but his sister Hilda Lini joined as the Minister for Health, becoming Vanuatu's first female minister.

However, as seems to be not uncommon in Vanuatu, the NUP split, after it was thrown out of coalition. Four NUP MPs formed the new People's Democratic Party (PDP) and stayed in government (I'm sure you can start to see a pattern here).

The 1995 election resulted in another heavily divided parliament. The VP joined forces with the MPP and the Tan Union, and formed an alliance called the Unity Front. This makes Vanuatu look artificially more unified in the chart below.


Effective numbers of parties were, based on these results, 4.25 in terms of votes and 3.22 in terms of seats. However, this is misleading, as it counts the Unity Front as one party. While their vote results cannot be separated, 13 of the Unity Front seats were won by the VP, 5 by the MPP, and 2 by the Tan Union. Based on these figures, the effective number of parties in terms of seats increased to 4.36, a substantial increase.

Following the election, the Unity Front, the largest party, was unable to form government. The UMP faced factional splits, with one faction supporting coalition with the Unity Front (led by Maxime Carlot) and one faction supporting coalition with the NUP. The faction supporting a coalition with the NUP prevailed, and Serge Vohor of the UMP was sworn in as Prime Minister. However, he only served for fifty days. 

In February, a motion of no confidence was brought against Vohor's government, with the support of six UMP MPs. While the motion was delayed by a court challenge brought by Vohor and a boycott of Parliament by UMP and NUP MPs, on February 12, Vohor resigned as Prime Minister. Then followed a number of controversial events. The next day, the President signed a decree dissolving Parliament, but then revoked the decree and attempted to hide it.

The next session of parliament saw a violent argument, when health minister Hilda Lini strongly protested the installation of the oldest MP (the leader of the UMP dissident group) as Speaker. She was forcefully dragged from the chamber, the oldest MP was sat as Speaker. Carlot was elected as Prime Minister, but Vohor lodged a judgement against the proposal. On the first of March, the judgement was rejected and Carlot entered government in coalition with the Unity Party.

The UMP were still heavily split, though, and the government faced a myriad of problems. The UMP were split, and a scandal regarding an Australian businessman led to the government collapsing in September, and Vohor was re-elected as Prime Minister.

Elections in 1998 saw a resurgence for the Vanuaku Party. Candidate numbers increased dramatically, too, and Carlot formed a new political party called the Republicans. This split hurt the chances of the UMP, which slipped into second place.
The effective number of parties increased to 6.32 in terms of votes and 4.26 in terms of seats (to put this into perspective, the last Dutch election was 5.94 in terms of votes and 5.7 in terms of seats). The least squares index, a measure of proportionality, was 13.8 (a relatively 

The government formed was led by former VP Prime Minister Donald Kalpokas, with the support of the NUP. Kalpokas served as Prime Minister, though with a coalition with elements of the UMP and the John Frum movement after October 1998. He resigned as Prime Minister in 1999 to avoid a confidence vote,  and was replaced by Barak Sope of the Melanesian Progressive party, leading a coalition of his party, the UMP, the NUP, the Republicans and John Frum's party.

2001 saw another change of government, when, as the result of a scandal involving a Thai businessman and the national mint, the UMP joined the opposition VP, thus giving them a majority, and put down a motion of no confidence on 26 March. The incumbent government attempted to dissolve parliament to avoid the motion, but failed. The Speaker then rejected the motion due to errors in the typing, and closed Parliament, as it was the end of the session. The Supreme Court then declared that Parliament should reconvene, and while this was delayed, on the 13th of April the no-confidence motion was passed. The government was defeated, and replaced by a VP-UMP government led by Edward Natapei.

Elections took place in 2002, on the second of May. The result was, unsurprisingly, a more fragmented parliament. The UMP returned to first place, but only narrowly. The new Green Confederation contested its first election, and won some representation.
The effective number of parties, even using Adam Carr's numbers (which, despite my eternal gratefulness to Mr Carr for providing the only vote figures for this election, do not signify non-parliamentary parties as separate, instead clumping them up with the independents) is 5.9 in terms of votes and 5 in terms of seats, while the least squares index of disproportionality was 17.63.

The coalition government formed as a result of the election was a coalition between the VP and the UMP, as before, with Natapei as Prime Minister. During the next year, former Prime Minister and MPP leader Barak Sope was jailed for two years for forgery, but was pardoned by the president and won a by-election to succeed himself.

2003 saw a change in the coalition government, when the UMP was replaced in the coalition by the Greens and the National Unity Party, because a number of UMP ministers were involved in scandals and because UMP leader Vohor had been allegedly asking opposition members about the possibility of a new government.

However, 2004 was a rather more turbulent year. Presidential elections were scheduled for that year on the 23rd of March. While the voting was initially deadlocked, the opposition got together with the government to support opposition preferred candidate Alfred Maseng. Unfortunately, it turned out after the election that Maseng was a convicted criminal, and his conviction had been missed by the Electoral Commission, though he refused to step down of his own accord. He was formally removed from office in May, and the Speaker sat in as President until August, when Kalkot Mataskelekele was elected President

In the wake of this, a motion of no confidence was put down, also in May. Natapei, not wanting to face it, asked the acting President to dissolve Parliament. This request was granted, and an election was scheduled for 6 July.

The election was notable for the factional struggles of the VP, when the faction supporting former Prime Minister Donald Kalpokas decided to contest the election as the Vanua K group. The election was also contested by the People's Action Party (PAP), another VP breakaway group. The People's Progressive Party, a centre-left group, also contested this election for the first time; this party was led by Sato Kilman, who is now Prime Minister.
At the moment, I don't have time to collate Adam Carr's constituency results into vote shares, and nationwide vote shares, so seat shares will have to do. As far as I can tell, the Vanua K group did not win any seats, though they may have rejoined the VP after the election and have not shown up on the seat counts.

The government formation process after the election was long and complicated, but in the end Serge Vohor, the UMP leader, formed government, with a broad coalition encompassing the Republicans, Independents and the MPP, However, Vohor did not last long as Prime Minister. A controversy involving Vohor establishing a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan (to be accurate, the Republic of China, which claims to be the legitimate government of all of China, despite only controlling the island of Taiwan). While Vohor viewed this as a clever idea to start an aid bidding war between the Republic and People's Republic (both countries have been accused of using 'chequebook diplomacy' to buy the support of Pacific countries), it led to a no-confidence motion in his government, which led to him being replaced as Prime Minister by NUP leader Ham Lini.

By Vanuatu's standards, Lini lasted a very long time as Prime Minister. He served until the 2008 election, which was another heavily fragmented contest. I've given up on bar graphs, by the way, and the below chart has the results of this election, only in terms of seats, as a pie graph.


As you can see, the parliament was heavily fragmented (the exact effective number of parties is 8.24), and it took same weeks to form a government. In the end, a coalition between the VP and the NUP, with some smaller parties and independents, was formed, and Edward Natapei was returned to the Prime Ministership, with a razor-thin majority of 27-25.

However, as is normal in Vanuatu, this government was hardly stable. A bewildering mix of reshuffles, confidence votes and defections eventually led to the NUP being dropped from the government and replaced by the People's Progressive Party, Greens and some other minor parties.

Natapei stayed in office until early December 2010, when after controversies regarding Vanuatu's support for West Papua , a number of members of the coalition crossed the floor. A motion of no confidence in Natapei's government passed 30-15, and PPP leader Sato Kilman was chosen as Prime Minister, in a coalition with the Greens, the NUP, the Republicans, a faction of the VP and other small parties.

With the government's thin majority, though, a no-confidence motion was eventually introduced, and passed 26-25. UMP leader Serge Vohor was elected Prime Minister. While you might think that would be the end of it, Kilman filed a motion in the Supreme Court to declare the motion void, on the basis that only 26, and not an absolute majority of 27, of the members had voted for it. The Court initially rejected the claim, but on 13 May, the appeal court found in favour of Kilman, who returned to office.

This did not end the legal wrangling around Kilman's election. Opposition leader Natapei filed a motion in the Supreme Court to have Kilman's original election as Prime Minister declared invalid. This motion was successful, and Natapei was appointed interim Prime Minister. This did him little good, and ten days later Kilman returned to office.

Kilman led Vanuatu up until the 2012 election. This election was even more fragmented than the previous one, and, while vote shares are available (collated by Wikipedia), they are too difficult to put into a chart, and so only seat figures are displayed below. It saw the conservative Land and Justice, the Union for Reunification and Change (a UMP split-off), and the Iauko Group (dissidents from the Vanuaku Party) contest for the first time, as well as a variety of other new parties.
The effective number of parties in terms of seats went up to a staggering 8.24, higher than Israel at all but one of their elections, and far higher than the Netherlands (both countries with pure party-list proportional representation with a single national district).

Following the election, Kilman remained in office, with the support of the Movement for Unification and Change, the National United Party, the Iauko Group and some other small parties. He served until 20 March 2013, when he resigned to prevent a motion of no confidence. He was replaced by Greens Confederation leader Moana Carcasses.

Carcasses' government lasted until May 2014, when he himself was defeated in a parliamentary vote by Joe Natuman, with a relatively comfortable majority. Natuman, too, did not last in the job; he was brought down by Kilman. This was a period of not just political turbulence for Vanuatu; under Natuman's leadership, Vanuatu had been hit by Cyclone Pam, which had displaced thousands and caused hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage, and the distribution of the aid money to rebuild was listed as a reason for the no-confidence vote against Natuman.

Kilman's government was hit by dramatic events in October 2015, when fourteen MPs, including former Prime Minister Carcasses, were convicted of bribery and were sent to prison. This meant that they lost their seats in Parliament. With Vanuatu's politics paralysed, President Baldwin Londsdale dissolved Parliament, and, with his dissolution approved by the Supreme Court, Vanuatu's election took place.

Outlook

Already, media reports say that a record number of parties will contest this election (28). It is not going to be one for consolidation, and the likely result of the election will be more instability, and no party with even close to a clear majority.

But why is this? Well, the surface issue is factionalism. We have seen how the parties have split (for example, three of the new parties in the 2012 election were led by former UMP members), and how this has contributed to the transformation of Vanuatu from a two-party system to a dramatically fragmented multi-party one. 

Where does this come from, though? Well, the root issue, in my view, is the single transferable vote. This system encouraged factionalism when it was in use in Taiwan and Japan, as it encourages political clientelism (MPs are encouraged to build support networks through small sectors of the electorate), and it has clearly done the same in Vanuatu. It has failed to discourage party splits, too, as it actually rewards splits (it is much easier for a small party with 10% of the vote in a district to put up one candidate and encourage support for them than it is for a large party to split its votes between multiple candidates.).

So, why isn't it done away with? Well, that's the issue. It is a true maxim that those with power under an electoral system don't wish to change it, and those who wish to change it often don't have the power. In New Zealand, it took two wrong winners in elections and massive amounts of public support to change the electoral system. In Vanuatu, those who prosper are the small parties, and virtually all political parties in Vanuatu are small. To some extend, Vanuatu is addicted to the single non-transferable vote.

Electoral reform would be difficult indeed, and, in fact, the only talk of reform is in terms of changing to a presidential system. Perhaps this will happen if voter support is high enough. I have seen nothing suggesting that electoral reform is even discussed, and the evolutionary nature of this change means that it will probably not be much of a national political movement compared to presidentialism, which can be consolidated behind a popular figure.

If Vanuatu tells us anything, it is the importance of getting first decisions right when designing an electoral system. As avid readers will recall, the people who invented SNTV for Vanuatu (colonial officials) were not provided with any information on proportional representation systems. This decision has had, as you can see, dramatic repercussions.

Author's Note: For reasons unrelated to the election, I will be travelling to Vanuatu on the 12th and returning to Australia on the 22nd (polling day!). I will not be staying in the cities, but I hope to get in to have a look at the campaigning, and I will be in the capital of Port Vila for most of polling day (again, not on purpose; due to flight timing). Anyone interested in the matter can follow me on Twitter (all opinions my own, are left at the door when I write my blog and opinions will not come into my Vanuatu observations).