Another constitution for Thailand?

"Though 'junta' is committee, is not really what is mean

One person's endless nightmare is to other perfect dream

Is order when are doing all just what you tell them to

And freedom of the press is freedom to agree with you!"

--this

Thailand is currently preparing for a referendum on the new constitution, scheduled for 7 August. The proposal represents the finalisation of a process of constitutional change initiated by the military government which took over in May 2014. During this period, the nation has been ruled by the military-dominated National Council for Peace and Order and the National Legislative Assembly under the interim charter; neither body is elected. 

I have written before about the military government's plans for the electoral system, some of which were put in the draft. However, the issues with the draft do go further than the issues with the electoral system. It contains provisions that appear designed to allow substantial military control over the government, and certain elements are a regression on the previous constitutional arrangements.

Thailand's constitutional problem

As I have written before on my previous Thailand post, the country has had persistent problems with political stability. Thailand has had twelve successful coups since the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, most of which have resulted in new constitutions.

The below image shows all the Constitutions of Thailand since the 1970s. Coups normally install interim constitutions, providing for appointed legislatures with few or no protections for human rights. Updated, democratic, constitutions are then written by the coup leaders, though often slowly.

Thai constitutions since the 1970s (own image)

This process has led to frequently interrupted civilian government, and to generally highly unstable government in the country. Up until the 1997 Constitution, an electoral system that encouraged factionalised and weak political parties also contributed to a highly unstable political system.

Following the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, the populist, somewhat leftist Thai Rak Thai party emerged on the political scene, led by businessman Thaksin Shinawatara. It contested its first election in 2001. Partially thanks to the new electoral system, which encouraged national, broad-based parties, Thai Rak Thai secured 248 of 500 seats; by far the strongest result for a single political party in Thai political history. The party was able to build on this to win a comfortable majority of seats in the 2005 election; 375 of 500.

This has created a serious conflict between opponents of and supporters of the Thai Rak Thai party and its predecessors, and supporters of the opposition. The opposition has proved relatively unsuccessful electorally, but opponents of the government have been able to use military coups to overturn what they see as a corrupt government.

The new constitution

As has been the case for all Thailand's democratic constitutions, a parliamentary system of government is provided for. However, the Thai monarch remains as head of state, as is normal for a constitutional monarchy.

The first thing in the document is, indeed, provisions dealing with the monarch, who is to be "enthroned in a position of revered worship" and "shall not be violated". Based on the three most recent versions of the Constitution, this appears to be standard practice in Thai constitutions. This would seem to be related to controversial lese-majeste laws restricting criticism of the monarchy.

There is also a section dealing with rights and freedoms. These provide for the right to presumption of innocence, prevention of self-incrimination, and other standard rights in relation to criminal law. The provision on freedom of speech, however, has the caveat that it may be restricted "by virtue of the provisions of the law specifically enacted for the purpose of maintaining the security of the State, protecting the rights or liberties of other persons, maintaining public order or good morals of people, or safeguarding the health of the people". Provisions of this sort restricting freedom of speech are hardly unusual internationally, or in Thailand for that matter. Various other rights, such as freedom of association and travel, have similar caveats.

The 'Duties of the State' section sets out various roles that the Thai government must play. These can be quite specific: for example, the government is prohibited from selling more than half of utilities to the private sector. The government must also provide public healthcare and free education for children for twelve years.

Government provisions

The Constitution provides for a bicameral parliament, consisting of a House of Representatives and Senate. The House of Representatives is the larger, elected House, with five hundred members. It is elected using mixed-member proportional representation, as was hinted at by the drafters of the constitution. 70% of the House is elected in single-member districts using the plurality system. Voters only cast votes for the single-member districts; there is no separate party-list ballot paper, as was in place under the previous system.

The remaining members are chosen from closed party lists, in a manner designed to compensate for the disproportionality caused by the single-member plurality system. The total number of members for each party is calculated based on the votes cast for the party, and the seats each party has won in constituencies are subtracted from this figure. Remaining members are elected from the closed lists. 

While such specific details of an electoral system may seem unusual to entrench in a constitution, this also appears to be standard Thai constitutional practice. What is more unusual about the electoral system is that there is specific provision for voters to cast a vote against all candidates. If this 'against all' option receives the most votes in a district, a by-election is required in which all candidates who ran in the original election are disqualified from contesting.

What is the value of such a provision? Well, the anti-Thai Rak Thai/Thaskinite opposition political parties often boycott elections as a protest tactic. They did this in 2006, as part of the leadup towards the coup of that year, and in 2014, which had a similar outcome. 

If there is an election boycott, under this constitution, it will be possible for districts in the South, an area that traditionally opposes the government, to constantly fail to return members of the House. As 95% of members of the House are required to convene a session, it would be theoretically possible for a boycott to render Thailand ungovernable. This has happened in the past despite the lack of this provision, though it is now entrenched and stricter than it was.

The House sits for a four-year term, though it can be dissolved by decree of the monarch early (there is no specific provision for this action being taken on the advice of the Prime Minister or Cabinet, though this is also standard Thai constitutional practice). 

One of the other unusual procedures mentioned in this constitution is the procedure of choosing a Prime Minister. Section 88 states that each party nominating candidates must put forward a list of three candidates for the post before an election. However, it is somewhat unclear as to whether this means that the Prime Minister must come from one of these lists. 

The provision on choosing the Prime Minister states that "the House of Representatives shall complete its consideration and approval of a person suitable to be appointed as Prime Minister as selected from the nominees having the qualifications and not falling under the prohibitions under Section 160 including who appear in the lists presented according to Section 88". It is not clear whether this means only people who appear on the lists are permitted to serve as Prime Minister, though later provisions suggest that this is the case.

There is an eight-year term limit on the office of Prime Minister, a relatively rare provision in parliamentary countries. The government is responsible to the House of Representatives, with 20% of MPs being required to initiate a confidence debate.

As said before, the parliament is bicameral. The other house is the Senate. With the 1997 Constitution, this house became an elected one; previous democratic constitutions providing for bicameralism had made the Senate appointed by the King. It would be elected on a non-partisan basis, however, with restrictions on political advertising.  Under the 2007 Constitution, this was changed to have half the Senate appointed, and half of it elected.

This draft goes the whole way, and provides that the entire Senate shall be appointed by the King. There is no specific provision that the Prime Minister or Cabinet should be consulted, and I am unsure whether this is standard practice for the Senators appointed prior to 1997 and following 2007. The Senate, however, only has power to delay legislation; for financial bills, forty days. Other bills may be delayed for two hundred and forty days, but the House majority retains the authority to present bills for Royal Assent after this period. Following presentation for Royal Assent, the monarch may refuse to sign the bill: he can be over-ridden by two-thirds of the members of both Houses of parliament.

Amending procedures have changed somewhat from the 2007 post-coup constitution. This Constitution could be amended, with public consultation, by a majority of both houses (apparently sitting in joint session). The draft Constitution requires that this include 20% of the members of parties without representation in the Cabinet (i.e. non-government parties), and a third of the appointed Senate. This will make amendment likely impossible without Democrat support. For a constitution with such specific provisions, and in a country where there is such a sharp partisan division, this provision appears put in place to entrench very specific laws.

Transitory provisions-the devil in the detail

The most contentious provisions of this constitution are those at the end; the so called 'transitory provisions'. These are provisions that are not meant to be permanent, but to enable the transition from military rule to democratic rule.

For a start, the unelected National Legislative Assembly will remain the national legislature until new elections are held. These elections can only be held after legislation governing a wide variety of issues is passed, including laws on the prevention of corruption, laws on criminal procedure for dealing with politicians, and laws detailing the appointment of the Ombudsman. These laws may take up to 240 days to consider. There is then a further 150 days until elections must take place.

Furthermore, the first Senate will be appointed by the King on the advice of the National Council for Peace and Order, the military junta governing the country at present. The Senate may, for its first term, force a joint sitting if the House is voting on any bill designed to acquit government employees from crimes or 2/3 of the Senate vote that a bill seriously affects the justice process.

The provisions for choosing a Prime Minister from the lists submitted before the election is somewhat confused in the transitional provisions. Apparently, the National Assembly may, with a 2/3 majority, choose a person not on the lists. This would suggest that the lists drawn up before the election are, under normal circumstances, binding on the parties and that people outside the lists may not serve as Prime Minister.

What does this mean for the future of Thailand?

This constitution has some clear advantages, at least for democratic stability, over previous iterations of the document. The new electoral system will be advantageous towards the Democrat Party, true, but only insofar as it will provide the party with more proportional representation. This may mean that the successor to the Thai Rak Thai party that will no doubt contest this election will have to form a more inclusive coalition than is normal. This may reduce the chances of a serious conflict between the government and opposition, and thus a coup. However, the closed list nature of the electoral system will prevent parties becoming weak and factionally divided.

The appointed nature of the Senate, especially its initial appointment by the junta, means that it will substantially delay action by any civilian government: important, seeing as all laws made by the junta government are considered to be constitutional by the transitory provisions. The constitution will also be much more difficult to amend than previously, partially thanks to the appointed Senate, and partially thanks to the provisions requiring opposition parties to support any change. Organic laws, those that deal with political parties, procedures of the Constitutional Court and choosing Senators (amongst other matters) must be approved by a joint sitting, giving the appointed Senate substantial control over these matters.

However, the former coup leaders having influence over future civilian governance is not unusual in Thailand. Many transitions to democracy under new constitutions have involved 'tutelage' periods, in which the democratic government shared power with the former coup leaders. And yet, this did not make the Constitutions more durable. Depressingly, this constitution may simply end up lasting only a few years.

One new provision that has been included that could potentially improve the durability of this Constitution is the introduction of local assemblies, with vaguely defined but seemingly meaningful powers. While local assemblies are not automatic (they are only to be implemented "according to the will of people in the locality"), they do have the power to "govern and provide public services and activities for the benefit of people in the locality". Furthermore, there is a responsibility on the central government to "ensure that a local government organisation has revenue of its own by organising an appropriate tax system or tax collection system".

Such provisions have the potential to reduce the winner-take-all nature of the central government, and allow areas that strongly support the opposition to make decisions over their own policies. Nonetheless, there are issues; the vague nature of determining the will of people in the locality, for example, could lead to the national government refusing to introduce any local assemblies. Previous Constitutions contained similar language in relation to local assemblies, though were more vague on provisions for the duties of said assemblies and the need for the national government to allocate taxes to them.

On August 7, the referendum will take place. The restrictive nature of laws on campaigning, combined with the fact that a rejection of the draft will only push elections back, makes it likely that the draft will be accepted. While there are some encouraging signs that the new draft will make conflict less likely, it will be very difficult to get Thailand out of coup culture. There is only so much any constitution can do alone. 

Coalition government in New Zealand

In recent days, the New Zealand Labour and Green parties have signed a memorandum of understanding to co-operate closer. The deal contains an agreement "to work co-operatively to change the government at the 2017 election". Collaboration in Parliament is agreed, and an investigation into a joint campaign is promised.

New Zealand's change of electoral system in 1993 has changed the government formation process substantially. The Greens are a substantial political presence in New Zealand, and for the past few elections it has been considered that Green support will be essential for a future Labour government?

But, is this a good deal for Labour? Will it be good for the Greens? And what will it mean for New Zealand's party system? In order to answer these questions, we need to look at how New Zealand's governing coalitions have been formed in the past.

How it all started

In the beginning, there was SMP (single-member plurality). Each district elected one member, voters had one vote, and the candidate with the most votes won. This system was inherited from the United Kingdom, although the two-round system was briefly used between 1908 and 1913. As would be expected with such an electoral system, a two-party system was established. Electoral competition was predominantly between the centre-right National and centre-left Labour parties. The party that won the most votes would win the most seats, normally with a bonus.

In 1954, the first substantial third party since the creation of the National Party contested an election. The Social Credit Party won 11% of the vote, but their votes were spread to thinly for them to win any seats. It took until 1966 until they won a seat, and that was when they won 14.5% of the vote. A new third party, the environmentalist Values Party entered the scene in 1972

The lack of parliamentary influence of the minor parties, along with the general satisfaction of the main two parties with the system meant that reform was not planned. This changed in 1978, when the National Party government of Robert Muldoon secured 51 of 92 seats, despite winning 39.8% of the vote to 40.4% for Labour (which won only 40 seats). At the same election, Social Credit secured a record result of 16%, but only won a single seat.

A similar result was repeated in the next election, with Labour winning 39% to 38.8% for National, but with Labour winning 43 seats to 47 for National. Social Credit secured their best result, winning 20%, but only won one extra seat.

The Muldoon government lost support before the next election, held in 1984, which resulted in a Labour victory. Labour won 43% of the vote and 56 seats, to 36% and 37 seats for National. The newly formed libertarian New Zealand Party won 12.3%, but no seats, while Social Credit's vote dropped to 7.6%; despite this, the party still held on to their two seats.

It was following this election that Labour announced a Royal Commission into the electoral system. The Commission was given the task of investigating into a wide variety of aspects of New Zealand's elections, including political finance, Indigenous New Zealander (Maori) representation, the term of parliament, the use of referenda, the financing of political campaigns and, of course, the electoral system.

The report of the commission was released in late 1986, with a wide variety of proposals. In terms of referendums, it proposed that government should hold referendums from time to time, and that they should be binding, but that there should be no mechanism for members of the public to trigger a referendum by petition. It proposed that Parliament should be increased to 120 members, and a referendum should be held on extending the parliamentary term to four years from three.

However, the most important recommendation was on the electoral system itself. The report ran through a wide variety of alternatives, rejecting most that would keep single-member districts such as the two-round system and instant runoff voting. Three systems were evaluated: mixed-member proportional representation, mixed-member majoritarian, and the single transferable vote. Oddly, the method of the single transferable vote that was chosen for evaluation involved the much maligned Australian-style (not any more, in most cases) group ticket voting, where voters have the option to vote for a party's preference ticket.

This would have been disastrous (source-NZ Electoral Commission)

Overall, the Royal Commission decided upon the mixed-member proportional representation system, although they stated that a referendum should take place before 1987. The proposed system would have sixty single-member district seats to sixty party-list seats, with a 4% threshold.

New Zealand had, at that point, four Maori electorates. In these electorates, only Maori voters or descendants of Maori voters may register to vote, though there is no restriction on who may stand as a candidate. The report proposed abolishing these seats, and replacing them with an exception to the 4% threshold for parties "primarily representing Maori interests", though how that is defined is somewhat unclear.

Despite the report, no referendum was held at the 1987 election. Labour increased their majority in the 1987 election, winning 57 seats in an expanded 97 member parliament to 40 for National. The Social Credit Party was renamed the Democrats, but their support collapsed to 5.7%, and they lost both of their seats.

At the 1990 election, Labour's support dropped dramatically; they won only 35% of the vote, and 29 seats. The National Party only improved its vote share marginally, from 44% to 47.8%; however, they gained 27 seats from Labour, to end with 67. Two new parties were formed to contest the election; the NewLabour party, led by former Labour MP Jim Anderton, which promoted more left-wing policies than the mainstream Labour party, and the Green Party, which promoted environmental policies. The parties won 5.16% and 6.85% of the vote respectively, but only one member of the two parties was elected-Jim Anderton himself.

The National Party had pledged to begin the referendum process if they won government. In 1992, a referendum took place, with two questions on the ballot. On the first, voters approved (in principle) a new electoral system, with 84.7% support. On the second question, voters were asked what sort of electoral system they would prefer. Mixed-member proportional representation secured 70.5% of the (valid) vote, to 17.4% for the single transferable vote, 6.6% for preferential voting, and 5.5% for a mixed-member majoritarian system.

In order to complete the process, a second referendum took place one year later, held on the same day as the election of that year. The result was a much more narrow vote for the change to MMP; 53% voted for change, which nonetheless constituted an endorsement of the proposal.

At the same election, the National Party was re-elected to government, winning 50 seats off 35% of the vote. Labour dramatically improved its seat total, winning 45 seats, though their vote actually dropped by 0.5%. The newly formed Alliance (a coalition of the NewLabour, Green, and Democrat parties, as well as some smaller left-wing parties) won 18.2% of the vote, but only two seats, while the New Zealand First Party, a nationalist group led by former National MP Winston Peters, won 8.4% of the vote and two seats.

While National were initially able to form a majority government, anticipation of the new electoral system caused a number of new parties to be formed. The most prominent of these was the United Party, a centrist group formed by several Labour and National MPs. Other Labour and National MPs deserted to the established smaller parties.

The MMP Era

The result of the 1996 election, the first held under MMP, resulted in National winning the most seats. They won 34% of the vote, and 44 out of 120 seats. Labour fared poorly, too, winning 28% of the vote and 37 seats. NZ First won 13%, and 17 seats (including all five Maori seats), while the Alliance dropped substantially, and the party won 10% of the vote and thirteen seats. A new libertarian party, the Alliance of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT), won 6% of the vote and eight seats. The United Party was nearly wiped out; it only won 0.9% of the vote, and elected only one MP (former Labour MP Peter Dunne won his constituency, helped by National not contesting).

The result put the New Zealand First party in a pivotal position. Most likely governments would require support from the party. With Peters and other NZ First figures given substantial cabinet portfolios, NZ First went somewhat unexpectedly into coalition with the National Party.

The coalition was not a comfortable one, as NZ First began to lose support in the polls. Following him being sacked from the cabinet, and in an attempt to strengthen his support, Peters announced that he would drop out of the government, which would have theoretically led to the government losing its majority. However, a number of NZ First MPs did not agree with Peters (coincidentally, a fair few of these were cabinet members, who would lose their places), and left the party. These MPs formed the new Maori Pacific Party, and continued to support the National government.

MMP came in for some criticism at this point, especially following the case of one MP, Alamein Kopu. Ms Kopu had been elected as an Alliance MP on the party list, but, following a falling-out with the leadership, left the party. She formed a new party, the Mana Wahine, and decided to support the National Party government. This was criticised, as it was seen that people voting for the Alliance Party did not expect their vote to go to the centre-right National Party. These cases led to a law being passed to allow MPs to have their seats declared vacant if they leave the party they were elected as part of, though that section has now expired.

An election was called for 1999. The National Party leadership had changed hands, and the party was led by Jenny Shipley. Labour was led by Helen Clark. Polls leading up to the election suggested that Labour would win the most seats, though they would still have to form a coalition in order to win government. The Greens had split from the Alliance, and were contesting the election separately; it was unclear whether they would be able to pass the 5% threshold.

Labour did end up winning the most seats, winning 49 seats overall with 39% of the party vote. National's vote held up fairly well; they won 30.5% of the party vote, and 39 seats. The Alliance fell back slightly, winning 7.8% of the party vote, and ten seats; this was likely due to the rise of the Greens, who just crossed the threshold with 5.1% of the vote, as well as winning the electorate seat of Coromandel from National. ACT's vote held steady at 7% and nine seats. Peter Dunne was re-elected thanks to a lack of National Party opposition, though his party won only 0.5% of the vote.

The big loser of the election was NZ First, which collapsed to 4.3% of the party vote. While this put them below the 5% threshold, New Zealand MMP allows a party to win list seats if they win a constituency seat. Peters clung on to his seat of Tauranga by a mere 63 votes, allowing his party to win five seats in the House. The parties formed by defectors performed even worse, with Maori Pacific winning just 0.2% of the party vote, and Mana Wahine's twelve electorate candidates won 0.05% of the vote (though this was better than the party's performance in the Taranaki by-election a year earlier, when the party won seven votes)

Following the election, it was clear that Labour would form government, but less clear how this would be done. The obvious coalition of Labour and the Alliance would have 59 seats, two short of a majority. The Green MPs agreed to support the government, by voting for them on issues of confidence and supply.

The government lasted most of an ordinary parliamentary term; however, a split developed within the Alliance. Jim Anderton left the party, in order to form a new Progressive Party, though he formally stayed within the Alliance. Clark used this in order to call an early election in July 2002.

The results of the election were a resounding first place for Labour, which won 41% of the party vote and 52 seats. National's vote dropped by 10% to 21% of the party vote, and the party only won 27 seats. NZ First made a substantial recovery, securing 10.4% of the vote and thirteen seats, while ACT once again secured 7% of the vote and nine seats. The Greens won the same votes and seats as ACT, though they lost the seat of Coromandel. The most substantial gain was made by Peter Dunne's United Future, which won 6.7% of the vote and eight seats. Anderton's Progressive Party won 1.7% of the vote, which would not normally be enough for parliamentary representation. However, Anderton was comfortably elected in his constituency. The Alliance won 1.3% of the party vote, and did not win a constituency seat, winning they lost all parliamentary representation.

Clark easily formed a coalition with the Progressive Party, but this left her slightly short of a majority. She decided to include United Future in government, though not in cabinet. This nonetheless had a substantial negative effect on the party's support, as would be shown at the next election.

The National Party, under the leadership of Don Brash, made substantial gains at the next election. Labour's vote remained stationary at 41%, and lost one seat. National made large gains, winning 39% of the vote and 48 seats. Most of the minor parties lost support, with NZ First falling to 5.7% and seven seats, and Peters losing Tauranga. The Greens won 5.3% of the vote and 6 seats. During the preceding parliamentary term, a number of Maori MPs had split from Labour, and formed the new Maori Party. This party won four of the Maori seats; however, its 2.1% of the party vote was only enough for them to be entitled to three. For this reason, Parliament was increased by one member.

United Future won only three seats and 2.7% of the party vote; their two list seats were only won because of Dunne winning his own seat. ACT, too, won two seats off 1.5% of the vote thanks to their seat of Epsom. Jim Anderton's party lost one seat, leaving Anderton as the only MP from his party.

The results left the government that would be formed in some doubt. Clark would easily get support from Anderton, but the other MPs would be less certain. Despite expressing distaste for the 'baubles of office', Winston Peters accepted the position of Foreign Minister under a Labour government. The Greens agreed to support the government on matters of confidence and supply, thus allowing a Labour government to take office.

This government lasted its full term, with relatively few hiccups. However, Labour lost support over the term, with National rising to a comfortable lead under the leadership of John Key. The election held in 2008 resulted in National winning the most seats. They won 45% of the vote, and 58 seats. Labour won 34% of the vote, and 43 seats. The Greens improved their support slightly, winning 6.7% of the vote and nine seats. ACT's support also increased, with the party winning 3.6% of the vote and five seats; their seats in parliament was still only secured by their victory in Epsom.

NZ First was the fourth party in terms of votes, with 4%. However, as this was below the 5% threshold, and as Peters did not win an electorate seat, the party did not win any seats. The Maori Party won 2.4% of the vote, but gained one electorate seat to finish with five; as their party vote only entitled them to three seats, this expanded Parliament to 122 members. United Future and the Progressive Party won one electorate seat each.

The coalition formed was a somewhat oversized one of United Future, ACT, and the Maori Party, allowing Key's government to hold a comfortable majority in the House. All three parties were coalition partners, in the sense that they all held ministerial portfolios. This meant that they were heavily connected with the government.

In 2011, another general election was called. The Key government had performed relatively well in the opinion polls, as before, and Labour was struggling. The Greens had improved their support, and NZ First was polling above the threshold, despite their lack of parliamentary representation.

The election gave National 59 seats, with 47% of the vote. Labour fell back, winning 27% of the vote and 34 seats, while the Greens improved their vote share to 11% and won 14 seats. NZ First returned to parliament, with 6.6% of the vote and eight seats.

The Maori Party had lost one seat in the parliamentary term, when Hone Harawira left to form the leftist Mana Party. He was re-elected, and the Maori Party lost another electorate seats. This left them with three seats, one more than their 1.4% of the party vote entitled them to: as a result, Parliament was increased by one member. ACT fell to one seat of Epsom, won due to a deliberately weak National campaign, and 1% of the party vote. United Future performed even worse, winning 0.6% of the vote and Dunne's electorate seat. The new right-wing Conservative Party won 2.7% of the vote, but no seats.

John Key was returned to office, continuing much the same coalition that he had led before the election. Labour continued to struggle in opposition, changing leaders halfway through the parliamentary term. The Conservative Party maintained a fairly strong, but generally sub-threshold position in the polls, provoking debate as to whether the National Party might give the party a free run at an electorate seat to give a new coalition partner parliamentary representation; in the end, this did not eventuate.

The 2014 election was somewhat similar to the 2011 one. National once again won the most votes by a wide margin, winning 47% and 60 out of 121 seats. Labour won only 25% of the vote, and 32 seats. The Greens secured 10.7% and 14 seats, almost identical to their previous results. NZ First improved its support to 8.7% and 11 seats. The Maori Party lost two electorate seats, but they held onto one, and their 1.3% of the party vote entitled them to one list seat. Harawira's Mana Party had merged with the civil-libertarian Internet Party, but Harawira lost his electorate seat, and the party won 1.4% of the party vote, so the alliance won no seats.

Once again, National ran a deliberately weak campaign in Epsom, allowing ACT to win, though they won only 0.7% of the party vote. The same treatment was given to Peter Dunne, who was re-elected in his constituency. However, his United Future party won 0.2% of the party vote (lower than the Legalise Cannabis Party), not enough for a list seat. Thus, Dunne was an overhang, and parliament expanded by one member. The Conservative Party won 4%, not enough to win a seat.

How has coalition government worked?

Since the introduction of MMP, no single party has had a majority, though National came very close in 2014. This has meant governments have of course had to form coalitions with other parties. As you have seen, coalitions have taken different forms; some parties sit in cabinet, others agree to back the government on motions of confidence and supply.

A coalition involves substantial risks for a political party. If the party wants to survive in government, they need to consistently support members from a different party in confidence and supply votes. For parties entering coalitions where there is a substantial ideological gulf between the parties, the largest and most powerful coalition partner will have more influence, and the compromises that need to be made may upset the smaller coalition partner's supporters.

The below chart shows how support for coalition partners has changed following elections.

(note: 1999 figure for loss for ministry members includes NZ First, which left Cabinet before the election)

As you can see, ministry members normally lose support, even in cases where the government gains support. The effect is not consistent for parties that supported the government but did not hold ministries, which could be attributed to their decreased visibility.

The effect of all of this has been to squeeze the support of certain minor parties. The below chart shows support for New Zealand's political parties since the introduction of MMP

At the first MMP election, the major parties received a little over 60% of the vote between them. This figure has risen since then, peaking at 80% in 2005. The figure is currently 75%, still higher than it was before 2005. The long term governing period of the National-ACT-Maori-United Future has done substantial damage to the small coalition partners, damage that appears somewhat irreparable (though, at this point, it is hard to tell).

What does this mean for the Greens?

So far, the Greens have never entered a close agreement with any party. Labour's relatively high vote share before 2008 meant that they could avoid a close agreement with the Greens, and in some cases an agreement with the Greens altogether.

However, it now appears certain that Labour will not be able to form any sort of government in the foreseeable future without Green support. If National loses the next election, the Greens will probably be the single largest coalition partner in NZ history, and will be in a position to make substantial demands of the Labour Party. The issue is what sort of relationship the Greens will want, and the Memorandum of Understanding suggests that it will be a relatively close one.

If New Zealand's history of coalitions suggests anything, a close relationship may have a negative impact on support for the Greens in the future, and could even lead to a party split as it did for the Alliance. On the other hand, the Greens obviously have certain policy goals, and positions in the executive would help them achieve these goals. 

The potential wild card in formation of the next New Zealand government is NZ First. Their leader, Winston Peters, was disdainful towards the agreement. On current polls, his support looks necessary for a Labour-Greens government to be formed in the future. Peters has usually expected fairly high offices under coalitions (Deputy Prime Minister under his 1996 coalition with National, Minister for Foreign Affairs under a 2005 coalition with Labour). Labour will also be fighting harder for his support, as the Greens are ideologically incompatible with National, while NZ First has managed to form government with National in the past.

Close cooperation between NZ Labour and the Greens may have distinct advantages for the Greens, in the form of easier ability to achieve policy goals. However, if this coalition lasts a long time, the past suggests that this will dramatically weaken Green support. Given that NZ First will also be in this coalition, and will likely expect substantial cabinet representation, a coalition between these three parties could lead to an increase in domination of the political system by the two major parties.

Scotland and Wales-some simulations

For those that didn't notice, elections to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales's devolved Parliaments, as well as to various local authorities in England and the mayoralty and assembly of Greater London, took place on May 5.

In 1997, referendums took place in Scotland and Wales on whether country-wide Parliaments should be introduced to govern the two regions. In both cases, the proposal was successful. Further referendums were held in Northern Ireland (where the assembly was part of a comprehensive peace deal) and London in 1998, where devolved assemblies were introduced.

In order to gain cross-party support for these assemblies, the Blair Labour government decided against using a single-member plurality electoral system to elect members of the Scottish and Welsh assemblies. Instead, it was decided to use a mixed-member proportional representation system.

In London, there are fourteen members elected in single-member districts, and eleven members elected from closed party lists. Voters have two votes; one for their single-member district candidate, and one for a party list. In the districts, the candidate with the most votes is elected. Following this, all the list votes are tallied up, and the eleven party list seats are allocated using the D'Hondt method of party list proportional representation.

However, it is modified somewhat. The number that the party's vote is divided by is increased by the number of single-member districts the party has won. So, if a party wins five single-member districts, its vote will be divided by six at the beginning of the D'Hondt count. A party needs to win 5% of the vote to win any party-list seats.

A very similar electoral system is used for Scotland and Wales. Scotland is divided into eight districts. In each of these, eight to ten members are elected in single-member districts, and seven members are elected using party-lists. An identical system to the one used in London is used to allocate the party-list seats: however, there is no threshold. This is made up for by the substantially reduced number of seats to be elected in these districts. If we add all the seats in a district together, we get an effective threshold of about 4.4%; however, this is probably lower in practice, and may depend on the results of the single-member districts.

Wales is identical, except the districts are somewhat smaller. Each district elects between seven to nine members in single-member districts, and four members in the party-list system. This makes it very much less proportional

Scottish results

A couple of months ago, I wrote this blog post on decoy lists in Scotland. As it turns out, Nicola Sturgeon does not read my blog, and as a result no party in Scotland tried the decoy list strategy. While the Greens only ran district candidates in a small number of districts, this was more so that they could focus their efforts on winning list votes.

However, what if the parties had used decoy lists? The below chart shows what would have happened if only the SNP had used decoy lists; that is, their list candidates and district candidates were not affiliated to each other. 

Compared to the actual results, the SNP would gain thirty seats. The Conservatives would lose thirteen seats, Labour eleven, the Greens five, and the Liberal Democrats one. Rather than their current position of governing in minority, with support from one of the opposition parties needed to back legislation, the SNP would have a comfortable majority. 

But what if other parties had followed the SNP's strategy? This would make Scotland effectively mixed-member majoritarian, an electoral system where the aim is to add some proportionality onto a majoritarian system. The goal of mixed-member proportional representation is to make the entire result proportional.

The SNP would only gain twenty-four seats this time, with their list gains balanced out by the ability of the Conservative and Labour parties to make the same sort of gains. However, Labour would lose ten seats and the Conservatives would win nine; Labour's substantial weakness in the constituencies would be exaggerated. The Liberal Democrats would win the same number of seats, as most of their seats were won in constituencies. The Greens would be, proportionally, the biggest losers; they would lose all but one of their seats.

Following the election, and the SNP's failure to win a majority, Alex Salmond stated on his weekly radio show that the electoral system used in Scotland was responsible for the result. In an interview that appears fairly incoherent, Salmond claimed that the 'variations' that led to the SNP not winning a majority were the fault of the regional list system.

But is this the case? Well, we can test this. The below charts show the results of the election using a national list system; to be precise, such a system would allocate all the list seats in one district, covering the entirety of Scotland. As such a system would be very proportional, there are two simulations; one with a 5% threshold, and one without.

It's quite clear that Salmond is wrong, at least in that sense. The national list system would not have given the SNP a majority; in fact, in both simulations they would be in an even weaker position. They would have won only the 59 seats they won in the constituencies. As you can see, there are few other differences; the Liberal Democrats and Greens would both gain a couple of seats, as they were disadvantaged by having their vote spread out in the districts, while UKIP, which won only 2% of the nationwide constituency vote, would win two seats without a threshold, and none with one.

In the same article, Salmond also supports the introduction of a single-vote MMP system. Under such a system, voters would have one vote, for a constituency candidate. That vote, however, would count as a party vote for the party that constituency candidate was affiliated to.

Were such a system implemented in Scotland, it would have a number of effects. For a start, it would be bad news for the Green Party. The Greens only ran a few constituency candidates, and focused their efforts on the list. In most constituencies, the Greens have little chance of election, and Green voters would be pushed towards tactically voting for a more competitive contender. This would mean the Greens would win fewer party votes, and thus substantially fewer seats.

At the same time, tactical voting in the constituencies would go down somewhat. Despite the above, some people would still vote Green in the constituencies, but they would obviously vote for someone else if there was no Green candidate, which is the case in most places. Abolishing the list ballot would mean the Greens would be forced to run a candidate in every seat. The same would go for weak Liberal Democrats, Conservative and Labour candidates; partisans for these parties would be less likely to switch to more viable constituency candidates closer to their party affiliation if that meant that they could not vote in any way for the party of their first choice.

Wales

The results of the Welsh elections were, on the face of it, rather unusual. Labour's vote in the constituencies dropped by 7.6% and their regional vote dropped by about 5%, but they only lost one seat. So, how did this happen?

Well, there are a number of reasons for this. First of all, the big gainer in these Welsh elections was UKIP. This Eurosceptic party has gained substantial support in recent years, and while it failed to make much of a mark in Scotland, at the 2015 general election the party polled 13.6% in Wales. 

Rather than focusing their attention on the party-list seats, like the Scottish Greens, UKIP ran constituency candidates in all but two constituencies. This meant that the opposition vote became more split. Labour also had an efficient vote spread; only 16% of the vote for Labour was cast in the constituencies that they did not win (which constituted 26% of the electorate).

This on its own does not cause disproportionality. For example, in Scotland, the Scottish National Party received 80% of the district seats, off only 46.5% of the vote. Wales had a similar imbalance, with 67% of the seats for Labour for 35% of the vote. However, Wales was twice as disproportional as Scotland, using the Gallagher Index.

The key issue causing disproportionality in Wales is the very low number of party-list seats. In Wales, the percentage of list seats is very low for an MMP jurisdiction.

What if Wales had a similar amount of proportional seats to Scotland? I have simulated this by adding three seats to each region, thus making the percentage of list seats 46.67% (compared to 45.74% for Scotland).

Labour would be the main loser, falling from one seat short of a majority to just 40% of the Assembly. Plaid Cymru, the Conservatives and UKIP would be slightly better off. The Liberal Democrats would be the big gainer, winning four seats, up from just one. 

Overall, the Gallagher Index of disproportionality for Wales would decrease from 13.03 to 7.25, closer to Scotland's 5.6. In an area like Wales, where one party is dominant and the opposition is heavily split, increasing the number of party-list compensatory seats would be a sensible step to ensure an accountable regional government.

Why does the Thai junta want MMP?.

Thailand is currently under the rule of a military junta, following a coup in 2014 against the government of Yingluck Shintawara. The coup is nothing especially unusual for Thailand, which has had 19 attempted coups, 13 of which have been successful.

The military government has said that they intend to return Thailand to democracy eventually: although they have not provided an exact date, it is expected that it will happen later this year, or next year. One of the key tasks that the junta has stated needs to take place before democracy is introduced is writing a new constitution.

Since the constitutional monarchy was introduced in 1932, Thailand has had seventeen constitutions and charters. Charters are documents set up to provide a basis to temporary military governments, and normally have been used for two or three years at a time. Constitutions have been more permanent, but none have lasted especially long.

The current constitution was drawn up and promulgated in 2007, following a coup in 2006. It provides, like all the other democratic constitutions, for a parliamentary system of government with a constitutional monarchy. A bicameral system was established, as had existed in the previous Constitution; however, the Senate was not able to remove ministers, and half of it was appointed. The House of Representatives was the premier house; it was directly elected, through a mixed-member majoritarian electoral system. Oddly, the exact provisions of the electoral law are enshrined in the Constitution.

Formally, the Prime Minister and the remainder of the Cabinet are appointed by the King; however, a no-confidence motion from the House can remove Ministers. This is similar to other constitutional monarchies, such as Australia and the United Kingdom. However, for various reasons (including the popularity of the King, and lese-majeste laws banning criticism of him) the King has had a more influential role than other constitutional monarchies.

The key factor in the two recent coups has been the governments of Thaksin Shinawatra and his sucessor and sister Yingluck Shinawatra (many female leaders in Asia have been related to former male leaders, such as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India or President Park Geun-hye).

Thaksin came to power following the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s. He was an influential businessman, and formed a political party called Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais). At the 2001 election, his party won 248 seats in the 500 member House of Representatives, a near majority, off 40.6% of the vote. This result was part of a growing trend of Thai politics towards consolidation of the party system, as the below graph shows.

As you can see, the 2001 election represented the largest share of the votes for the top two parties since vote shares became available, and probably before that. This is off the back of three subsequent increases.

Exactly why this is the case is unclear. However, Thailand's usage of a different electoral system may account for some of this. Just before the 2001 election, Thailand switched from a pure multiple non-transferable vote system to a mixed-member majoritarian system, with first-past-the-post used in the local districts. 

Shugart and Carey (1995) provides a rank-ordering of electoral systems based on the importance of the personal vote. The issue with this is that the rank-ordering places substantial emphasis on how parties nominate candidates and the ease of getting on the ballot, and information on this factor is unavailable. 

As a result, the switch to MMM would be likely to reduce the incentive to cultivate a personal vote. This could be expected to lead to party labels becoming more important in elections, and thus could be expected to lead to stronger, more disciplined parties. I do not have many cases to directly compare the Thai experience to, seeing as the MNTV system is relatively rare. However, the replacement of Taiwan's MMM system, which used the single non-transferable vote in multi-member districts for the local tier, with a MMM system that used single-member plurality in the local tier led to what was a multi-party system consolidating into a two-party system.

After the election, the Thai Rak Thai party merged with the New Aspiration Party, which had won 36 seats. This gave Thai Rak Thai a majority in the House of Representatives. Thaksin was thus able to implement a populist electoral platform, introducing subsidies for health care and petrol, constructing large amounts of new infrastructure, and low-interest loans for farmers.

Thaskin's policies proved popular, and he won a landslide victory at the 2005 election. His party won 377 seats, and approximately 62% of the vote. Thai Rak Thai dominated in the north and northeast of the country; this area is populated with poorer farmers, who would be most responsive to Thaskin's handouts. The infrastructure projects funded by his government allowed Thai Rak Thai to poll strongly in wealthier Bangkok. However, the south of the country was still dominated by the opposition centre-right Democratic Party. This region gave the Democrats half of their seats in the single-member districts alone.

The Thai Rak Thai majority was the first for any party in Thai history. The election also represented a peak of political consolidation, as 85% of votes were cast for the top two parties. Thaskin had been the first elected Thai prime minister to serve a full term in office.

However, all was not smooth for Thaskin. He faced allegations of corruption after his family sold shares in a telecommunications company following legislative changes that allowed the shares to be sold to a foreign owner. He denied claims of corruption, but, after protests against his government began, he decided to call an election in order to test his support.

While the election was called, the major opposition parties decided to boycott it, claiming that they were unfair and that Thailand needed constitutional reform before a fair election could be held. As a result, the elections were only contested by the Thai Rak Thai party, and a number of small unidentified parties.

In normal cases, election boycotts involve electors not turning up at the polls at all. However, Thailand gives voters the option of voting for 'no candidate' by ticking a box at the bottom of their ballot paper. In cases where only one candidate ran for election, the election would still be run, and a candidate would need support from 20% of registered voters. This would not be such a dramatic threshold for Thai Rak Thai MPs to win in most parts of the country. However, in the south, there were seven constituencies where Thai Rak Thai did not win 20% of the vote, and a further fourteen where the Thai Rak Thai candidate won less than 25%.

In these constituencies, the election boycott could be expected to lead to the Thai Rak Thai candidate not reaching the threshold. On election day, however, Thai Rak Thai lost forty seats, which had to be filled through by-elections. Even after these by-elections had been held, in which candidates alleged to be Thai Rak Thai 'dummies' filed in most seats in order to avoid the 20% absolute support threshold, another fourteen by-elections were needed.

However, at this point, the Constitutional Court upheld a complaint by the opposition that the elections were unconstitutional. Thaskin's cabinet decided not to contest this, and called elections for October of that year; just one month away. Democracy in Thailand would not last that long.

In the night of the 21st of September, military forces entered Bangkok and took control over the institutions of government. Thaskin was in New York at the time, intending to give a speech to the United Nations. The military government introduced new, strict security measures, but promised that democracy would be re-introduced 'in a year'.

The junta did, actually, keep their promise. After a year of heavily restricted political activity, a referendum was held in August 2007 on a new constitution. The patterns of voting followed traditional Thai patterns, with the South voting yes, and the North voting mostly no. 58% voted Yes, thus meaning parliamentary elections could be held later that year. Some changes were made to the electoral law; multi-member constituencies, elected using the multiple non-transferable vote, were used for some of the district tier seats. The number of party-list seats was reduced to eighty, and they were elected in ten-member districts.

Elections to the Representatives were scheduled for December. Thai Rak Thai had been banned, along with Thaskin from the country, so those who supported it needed a new political party. The new party formed was called the People Power Party, and was led by former Governor of Bangkok Samak Sundaravej. The Democrats were not dissolved, and contested the election. No other major forces entered the race, thus meaning that, to some extent, Thailand was back to where it started.

In the end, People Power won the election, securing 233 seats in the 480 member assembly; slightly short of a majority, but it would be expected that they would form the government. The Democrats won 165 seats, the conservative Thai Nation Party won 37 seats, and the moderate Motherland Party won 24. No other parties won more than ten seats.

What is interesting about this election is that the party vote was actually very close. Statistics conflict, but the People Power-Democrat gap was very narrow either way. The large lead for People Power in the seat totals was due to their substantial lead in the district seats, where the People Power vote was mostly the same; however, the opposition was more heavily split. There were only eighty proportional seats. This will become important later.

People Power formed the government, and Sundaravej became Prime Minister. However, he was opposed by the military, which still held substantial sway in Thai politics. In September 2008, he was found guilty of accepting payment from the private sector while in the office of Prime Minister: he hosted a number of cooking shows, for which he was paid. He was replaced by Somchai Wongsawat, a relation of Thaskin. 

However, his term was also short-lived. In December 2008, the People Power Party was banned for vote-buying and other corruption. At the time, there were massive public protests against the government, and protests for the government. Following the banning, the coalition partners of the People Power Party and some dissident People Power MPs formed a coalition with the Democrats, allowing Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajjva to become Prime Minister.

Vejjajjva's government was opposed by the newly formed Pheu Thai Party, which was led by former Prime Minister Wongsawat. This group had the support of the 'National Front for Democracy against Dictatorship', also known as the Red Shirts, which led protests against the Vejjajjva government calling for new elections.

One of the actions of the Vejjajjva government was a change to the electoral law. The number of party-list proportional representation seats was increased to 125, out of a 500 member legislature. Allocation was also changed to a nationwide level. The district tier was changed to single-member plurality only. These changes could be expected to advantage the Democratic Party, which had been substantially stronger in the party-list tier than in the districts.

The House was dissolved in 2011, and elections were called for July. Pheu Thai were led into this election by Yingluck Shinawatra, the sister of Thaskin. Vejjajva stayed as Democrat leader. Thai polls, as rare as they were, gave Pheu Thai a comfortable lead over the Democrats.

On the day, Pheu Thai won 265 seats in the 500 member House, a fairly comfortable majority. They won 48% of the party list vote, fairly close to a majority. The Democrats won 159 seats, and 39.6% of the party list vote; the electoral system still disadvantaged them, as this was only 31.8% of the seats. This was probably due to them only getting 32.3% of the district vote.

Oddly, the smaller parties were less represented in the proportional tier than in the districts. The Thai Pride Party, a populist party formed by former Thai Rak Thai members, received 11% of the vote in the single-member districts, and 29 out of 375 seats. However, they won only 3.9% in the party-list tier, and five seats. The National Development Party won 15 seats in the districts and 4.6% of the district vote, but only 2.8% of the party-list vote.

Following the election, Yingluck was appointed Prime Minister, after forming a (seemingly unnecessary) coalition with the Thai Pride and National Development parties. Her government followed similar policies to the previous Thai Rak Thai/People Power governments, and, unsurprisingly, faced the same protests that those same governments had faced.

One of the most controversial initiatives of Yingluck's government was an attempted amendment to the 2007 constitution. As constitutions go, the Thai one was at that time was relatively easy to amend. It required only an absolute majority vote of both houses, and a public hearing. Yingluck wanted to bring back a fully elected Senate, and passed it through the normal process. However, the Constitutional Court found that the reform was unconstitutional, on the basis that it had been changed while it was passing through the legislature.

2014 saw more political violence, as activists from both sides of politics sparred over the government's record. Political figures from both sides of the divide were killed and injured, and Yingluck, desperate to regain control over the situation, called an election in February 2014. However, this did not go so well. As in 2007, the opposition boycotted the election, but this time the security situation had deteriorated to the extent that the Electoral Commission was unable to hold the election at all in a substantial number of constituencies, and that in some seats, candidates did not nominate at all.

The election was invalidated by the Constitutional Court, however, as it had not been held on the same day in all areas. Weeks later, Yingluck was stripped of her office as Prime Minister over the transfer of a military official, and was replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister.

At this point, the military decided to take control over the government. On 22 May 2014, the military held meetings between the leaders of  the civilian parties. When the talks failed, General Prayut Chanocha informed the meeting that he had to seize power, and ordered the military to once again take control over government.

Once again, the military said that their control over government would be purely temporary, and that they would restore democracy at some point. They introduced a new interim constitution, which starts by saying that Thailand has a "democratic regime of government" before enshrining an appointed legislature and giving the poetically named "National Council for Peace and Order", the executive under the new regime, the power to decree anything they wished. Decrees would immediately become constitutional upon introduction.

So, what does this have to do with MMP?

For those of you who are desperate to hear about MMP, this is the part where it becomes important. The Constitution Drafting Committee has been working on a new constitution since the coup, and one of the things that they have suggested is a new electoral system for Thailand.

The option that has been most mentioned is a mixed member proportional representation system. Now, there is nothing unusual about this electoral system, and it has been proposed for many nations recently during electoral reform processes. However, your author cannot help but be a bit suspicious of the proposal when it comes from a military junta. So, the question is, what would be in it for the military if the MMP proposal was introduced?

The military are clearly no fans of the Thaskinite governments. As a result, it would make sense for the military to introduce an electoral system that disadvantaged these parties. While the Democrats deny such a connection, it is generally considered that they are closer to the military than the Thaskinites. It would also be an asset to the military government if the new electoral system would advantage the Democrats.

Below are the results of the 2011 election under various forms of MMP. From left to right; all parties with 5% of the vote allowed to win proportional representation seats, all parties with 5% or one constituency seat, all parties with 3%, and all parties with 3% or one constituency seat. The final column is the actual results of the election.

Click on the image for a larger size

My careful readers will note that the total number of seats is higher under all of the MMP systems. This is because of a feature of MMP called 'overhang'. Under most versions of MMP, a party which wins more seats in the districts than it is entitled to by the party-list calculation keeps those district seats, and the legislature is enlarged to compensate. With a 5% threshold, only Pheu Thai and the Democrats are entitled to the proportional representation seats, and therefore all 56 districts won by parties outside these two are overhang.

There is one consistent trend, if you look at the percentages. The Democrats always have a higher percentage of seats under a MMP system, because of their higher share of the party-list proportional representation vote. This gain mostly comes from the smaller parties, which are no longer able to boost their seat totals through the PR tier.

It is evident that the Democrats perform better in a nationwide ballot, so it is evidently clear that increasing the importance of the party-list ballots through mixed-member proportional representation would be good for them.

Another key advantage of MMP for the military is a likely increase in political fragmentation, and a weakening of the party system. MMP would make it easier for small parties with nationwide support to enter the House of Representatives. This would likely lead to a fragmented party system, as there would be less incentive for parties to merge.

An increase in political fragmentation would be advantageous to the military for one key reason; it would weaken the influence of civilian governments against the military, as they would be less stable without regular parliamentary majorities. It could be said that this is a good thing, as it means that the populists need to look for consensus more. However, it is clear what the military gets out of the arrangement.

All of this does not mean that mixed-member proportional representation would not necessarily be a good idea for Thailand. In my view, it would be a good idea to encourage consensus in what is evidently a heavily divided political culture. However, it is also evidently clear that the advantages for the military are very clear in implementing MMP, and the specific proposal will warrant very close examination in the context of the other constitutional features.

New Zealand elections-towards a two-party system? (Updated 22/09)

New Zealand will be holding a parliamentary election on the 20th of September. National Party leader John Key is the incumbent prime minister, and has been leading in the polls with around 45-50% of the vote since the last election. Opposition Leader David Cunliffe, who is leader of the left-wing Labour Party, has been trailing, with his party only having about 25-30% of the vote.
Under New Zealand's previous single-member plurality system, which was used in all elections up to 1996, Key would win a landslide victory, with about 100 seats in the 120 House of Representatives. However, a series of referendums during the 1990s, the new mixed-member proportional system was introduced. This system made New Zealand elections much more proportional.

The Mixed-Member Proportional system

The Mixed-Member Proportional voting system originated in Denmark, where it was used for some elections between 1915 and 1920. However, it was introduced as a system for West Germany after the Second World War.

Under the system, New Zealand is divided into 70 single-member electorates. Voters have two votes: one vote for a candidate in their electorate, and one party, or list, vote. In the single-member electorates, the candidate with the most votes is elected as the electorate member. But after these members are elected, all the party votes are added up. All parties that have either won 5% of the party vote or one single-member electorate have their votes put into a Sainte-Lague proportional representation allocation (an explanation here). The electorate seats that a party has won are subtracted from the total allocation of seats, and the remainders are distributed to party lists, submitted by the party before the election. If a party wins more electorate seats than its proportional allocation, it keeps these seats, and parliament increases in size accordingly.

This system aims to produce an overall allocation of seats that is proportional to votes, and it has meant that there have been no single-party government, and a significant number of small parties have won seats that they would not have won under single-member plurality.

However, recent political developments have reduced the number of political parties in the New Zealand political system, to the point where New Zealand may become a two or three party system in the near future.

Increased Polarisation

The chart below shows how the New Zealand Parliament stood after the 2011 election.

There have been some changes since this election. ACT's single member of parliament, John Banks, resigned over corruption allegations. A New Zealand First MP, Brendan Horan, resigned from his party to become an independent.
While there appear to be many parties, most of them align behind either Labour or National, and the only 'independent' party appears to be NZ First.
Another notable feature of this is that there are not many medium-sized parties. The two largest parties have 77% of the seats, and adding the Greens to this brings it up to about 93%. Why has this happened? Well, it's all part of the movement towards a two-party system.

"Electorate Seat" Parties

About half of the parties in the New Zealand parliament are dependent on electorate seats to win any seats at all. The electorate seat threshold means that winning an electorate seat can get list members into parliament, a useful mechanism for small parties. The Mana Party was the only party to have serious competition from a party in the same ideological column for its electorate seat. No National candidates stood in any of the seats won by the Maori Party, and while National candidates ran in Ohairu-Belmont (United Future) and Epsom (ACT), they mostly ran to get electorate funding, and their opponents received implicit support from the National party leadership.

Why would National sacrifice these seats, some of which were winnable for the party, to get candidates from minor parties elected? The answer is simple. National needs extra list seats to get a majority, and therefore needs ACT and United Future to pass the threshold, so they can get these seats. If ACT and United Future had won no seats, National would need to get very close to a majority to win government.

The Decline of Medium-Sized Parties

Recently, New Zealand has reduced its number of parties significantly. A good measure of this is the 'effective number of political parties'.  In order to calculate this, all of the percentages of the party votes (or seats) are squared, and added together. The number 1 is than divided by this figure.

As we can see, the number peaked in 2002, and has declined since then. It reached a bottom in 2008, and hasn't moved much since then. Why has this happened? Well, one issue is the issue of coalitions. Small parties in coalitions tend to lose votes after being parts of coalitions. After a coalition with National, NZ First fell below the 5% threshold, and had to rely on leader Winston Peters' electorate seat to stay in parliament. The left-wing Alliance splintered after a coalition with Labour, United Future went from 8 to 3 to 1 after Labour government (2001 to 2005 to 2008), and NZ First was forced out of parliament after a Labour coalition.

If Key falls short of a majority, this record may mean that the Greens and Mana Party (in alliance with Kim Dotcom's Internet Party)  pause for thought before jumping to coalition with Labour. In fact, it may be the ability of the Green Party to win votes that prevents New Zealand from becoming a pure two-party system.

Post-election update-22/09/14

The election is over. The National Party have been re-elected, with an overall majority of 61 members in a 121 member Parliament (Peter Dunne is the overhang). The main surprise of the night, however, was the strong performance by New Zealand First, and the poor performance by Labour. NZ First have had the benefit of eight years out of government (the longest stretch since MMP was introduced). The result is their third-best since MMP was introduced.

The effective number of parties in terms of votes has increased (from 3.15 to 3.21)  There are no new parties in Parliament (and the Internet Mana alliance did not enter Parliament, as Hone Harawira lost his electorate race).The Conservatives (a new right-wing party founded in 2011 by Colin Craig) increased their vote to about 4%, but fell short of the 5% threshold. 

The lack of any significant change in terms of Parliament, other than the slight drop for Labour and the increase for NZ First, means that the effective number of parties in terms of seats has fallen from 2.98 to 2.9, which is not a significant decrease, but is part of a trend.

The election may provoke debate over the level of the 5% threshold. A committee set up to review MMP has recommended that the threshold be lowered to 4%.  My table below shows how the results would have differed with a 4% threshold.

With a 4% threshold, the centre-right's total would increase by 3. National would lose two, and thus not have an overall majority, but the Conservative Party's five would cancel that out. Even if Key wanted to exclude the Conservatives from his government, the current combination of National-Maori-United Future-ACT would still have a majority, with 63 seats. Key could probably count on the Conservatives to support him in confidence votes, so this would really not matter.

The change would have a negative impact on the centre-left. Internet Mana only won 1.26% of the party vote, and thus would not be saved by the change. The Greens and Labour would lose two and one seats respectively, weakening any basis for a centre-left government.

If the National party's support drops significantly during the next 3 years, and the Conservatives stay above 4%, there may be some temptation for Key to accept that recommendation and reduce the threshold to 4%, especially if Peter Dunne resigns or loses his seat. Unless a left-wing party appears on the horizon with support above 4% (unlikely), this decision would make tactical sense for the Prime Minister, and would strengthen National's political position in the near future.