France Presidency 2017

France is scheduled to hold the first round of elections to the Presidency on the 23rd of April; if no candidate receives a majority of votes in this round, a second round will be held, between the top two candidates in the first round, on the 7th of May. Elections to the National Assembly, the popularly elected and most powerful house of the bicameral legislature, are also scheduled to take place in June, roughly one month after the likely second round of the presidential election.

I've written before about France's electoral system, but it is worth summarising the nation's constitutional arrangements at present. France has a semi-presidential system of government, with both a directly-elected President for a five-year term and a Prime Minister responsible to the lower house of the bicameral legislature (the National Assembly). The system is of the premier-presidential sub-type, meaning that the Prime Minister cannot be removed by the President, though they may appoint a Prime Minister.

This election follows five years of the presidency of Francois Hollande, a Socialist. Mr Hollande was elected to the presidency, defeating the leader of the centre-right UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) after seventeen years of centre-right control of the office. Mr Hollande, however, has struggled with a stagnant economy and high unemployment, and did not choose to seek re-election. He leaves office with low approval ratings, and with a Socialist Party that lost substantial support in local and European elections during his tenure.

Candidates

Benoit Hamon-Socialist Party

The governing Socialist Party held an open primary to determine their presidential candidate. Voters were required to be registered to vote in normal French elections, to donate one euro to the organisation conducting the primary (while only Socialist candidates were likely to win, candidates from minor parties closely affiliated to the Socialists also competed, hence the primary was branded as the "Citizens' Primary"), and to generally accept the values of the left. 1.6 million votes were cast in the first round, a figure which increased to 2 million in the second.

The leading candidates for this primary were Manuel Valls, a former Prime Minister, and Arnaud Montebourg and Benoit Hamon, both former cabinet ministers. Valls, considered a more right-wing candidate than the other two, led in early polls, but the first round of the primary resulted in an unexpected first place for Mr. Hamon, who won 36% to 31% for Mr. Valls and 17% for Mr. Montebourg. No other candidate won more than 7%. Montebourg endorsed Hamon for the second round, who won 58% to 42% for Valls.

Hamon is considered to be on the left of the Socialists, supporting a policy of providing a basic income to all citizens and the legalisation of cannabis.

Francois Fillon-The Republicans

Like the Socialists, the Republicans (a re-brand of the UMP) held an open primary to determine their nominee, in which the general public could vote. The unpopularity of the incumbent Socialist government made it likely that the Republican nominee would have a good chance of victory; hence, there was more interest in the Republican primary. 4.3 million voters turned out in the second round, 4.4 in the second.

Also similar to the Socialists, there were three main candidates in this primary. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy and former Prime Ministers Alain Juppe and Francois Fillon. Mr Juppe was the front-runner, with most expecting the runoff to between him and Mr Sarkozy. However, after a strong debate performance, Fillon surged to 44% in the first round, with Juppe on 29%, Sarkozy on 21% and no other candidate above 3%. With Sarkozy endorsing Fillon, he won an easy victory in the second round with 66% of the vote.

The victory gave Fillon frontrunner status; given the divided nature of the left, it was considered likely that he would face National Front candidate Marine Le Pen in the second round. Ms Le Pen's radical views mean that Fillon would likely win such a runoff comfortably with leftist votes. However, in recent days, he has been beset by a scandal involving his wife being paid for an apparently 'fake job', and his polling has dropped accordingly. It remains to be seen whether he will remain in the race.

Emmanuel Macron-Independent/En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron served as economy minister for two years as a Socialist, but resigned from the position last year, after conflicts with party positions on various matters within his portfolio. He then launched a new political party, En Marche!, and ran for the presidency. He has also signalled his intention to run a slate of candidates for the National Assembly election. 

Initial polls had Macron in third place, behind Le Pen and Fillon. However, following the Fillon scandal, recent polls have shown him catching up to Fillon, and advancing to the second round, where he receives the support of the centre-right and beats Le Pen comfortably. He stands on a platform of economic liberalisation and general social liberalism, to the right of Hamon and perhaps Le Pen economically, but to the left of Fillon and Le Pen on issues like immigration. 

Marine Le Pen-National Front

The National Front are a long-term minor presence on the French political scene. The usage of the two-round system, where the centre-left and right generally team up against National Front candidates in the second round, has generally led to little representation for the party in the National Assembly. The party's most substantial result in the past was Le Pen's father, Jean Le Pen, reaching the second round in the 2002 presidential election, narrowly beating Socialist Lionel Jospin in a fragmented race. Mr Le Pen's opponent in this round, UMP incumbent Jacques Chirac, received the endorsement of Mr Jospin, and much of the left, propelling him to a landslide victory (82-18).

Mainstream opposition to the party comes from distaste of its opposition to immigration and Islam, however, with an increase in concern about terrorism and immigration after the Syrian refugee crisis, the party's stocks have risen. They won the highest number of votes at the 2014 European election, and have performed strongly at lower-level elections throughout Mr Hollande's term. It appears likely that Ms Le Pen will win the highest number of votes in the first round of the election, with roughly 24%; however, most polls have her losing a runoff by twenty points or more to Mr Macron or Fillon.

Other candidates in the race include leftist Jean-Luc Melanchon, running with the support of the Left Front (successor to the Communist Party), though his candidacy is under the name 'Unsubmissive France', Green candidate Yannick Jadot, Nicholas Dupont Aignan (who is attempting to fill the niche between Fillon and Le Pen), and various other irrelevancies. Melanchon is the strongest of this group, polling at around 10%. None of the others is higer than 3%. Centrist Francois Bayrou has not yet stated whether he will stand for the election; polls that include him show him at 5%.

Problems with the two-round system

The two-round system is one of those most commonly used for presidential elections around the world. Much of this is due to many presidential systems (such as those in Senegal and the Central African Republic) being in place due to French influence during colonial times, but the system is used in countries like the Ukraine and Poland because it ensures a candidate will be elected with majority support. 

Nonetheless, the system has a substantial disadvantage in fragmented elections, which we may see demonstrated in this upcoming vote. In a fragmented election, the possibility exists that two candidates can make it to the second round with little initial support. If an ideological group splits itself between too many candidates, the possibility exists that no candidate representing a substantial ideological group is able to enter the second round.

An example of this is shown in the 2002 presidential election. Red candidates represent leftists, blue conservatives, black far-right candidates and cyan centrists. As you can see, Chirac and Le Pen finished first and second, and all voters had to choose between them in the second round. However, 45% of voters, all up, voted for a leftist candidate, compared to 29% for the left and 19% for the far-right. Yet there was no candidate for the leftists in the second round, because of the increased fragmentation of this group.

The problem arises because the two-round system does not necessarily provide great incentives for voters to coalesce around two candidates. Left-inclined voters in 2002 may have felt comfortable knowing that they could cast a ballot for a minor leftist, to signify their support for that particular candidate, thinking that Jospin would certainly enter the second round. A first-past-the-post system would mean voters would coalesce between two candidates, at least in theory; often, this squashes diversity in the party system, or leads to candidates being elected with little support.

While Fillon's woes have made this possibility likely, it could potentially have been the case that the left, with the backing of roughly 40% of the electorate, would have had no representation in the runoff. This particular issue is partially circumvented for National Assembly elections, where candidates can enter the second round if they receive the support of 12.5% of the registered electorate (on average, this represented 21.8% of the vote cast at the last election). However, the Constitution of France specifically entrenches the top-two requirement for presidential elections.

Even so, one of the key advantages of preferential voting for single-member seats (as the Presidency of France is) is demonstrated by this particular alternative; the usage of several rounds of exclusions and transfers results in the candidates in later stages of the count having wider support than their equivalents under the two-round system.

The National Assembly

The President has the right, after 'consultation' with the Prime Minister and Speaker, to dissolve the National Assembly at any time of his choosing. However, the Assembly's maximum term is five years, meaning that an election must be held by the tenth of June this year. 

No doubt, such an election date would serve the victor of the election well. The popularity bump incumbent presidents receive has meant that the last three legislative elections, all held shortly after those for the Presidency, have resulted in majorities for the newly elected President's party, a useful tool given that failure to control the Assembly means the President loses control over the cabinet and becomes less able to pass their agenda.

This will become an especially important point in the case of a victory by Mr. Macron. His 'En Marche!' party, as a cursory examination of its website will show, spends much of its time discussing Macron's statements alone. He has said he will run candidates for all 477 seats, but the  gives the appearance of being a mainly personalistic vehicle, focusing on providing a brand to its lead candidate, far more than any other French party. The Socialist and Republican sites show statements from a variety of other figures, and both parties, despite their weaknesses at this election, do have large legislative caucuses and incumbent members with personal vote factors.

Normal behaviour has been for the centre-left and centre-right to form opposing alliances where they allocate seats to parties within said alliances, with the National Front generally not being able to make the second round in most seats due to this tactic (unlike the presidential elections); in 2012, they only entered the second round in sixty-five seats, and won two. If Macron wins, it may well be the case that he forms an agreement with the existing leftist alliance (Socialists+Greens) that would allow the Socialists to have some influence over the new government, while giving some experience and aforementioned personal vote factors to the President.

It is still largely unpredictable what will happen at these elections. Perhaps reflecting the irrelevance of such polling until the winner of the Presidency is determined, the most recent poll with seat numbers was taken in June 2016. It had the centre-right winning a majority, and the National Front winning around fifty seats (in normal two-round elections, they have never left single digits; this would be their best result for any National Assembly election). Such a result, which seems consistent with general increases in support for the FN at the local and European level (implying it's not just Ms Le Pen's personal support) would provide a clear reminder of that party's growing influence, even if Le Pen loses.

Has the migrant crisis really impacted Austria's politics?

Austria, a small country in Europe's south-east, has been quite substantially impacted by the large numbers of Syrian immigrants travelling towards Western Europe. Like all countries in Europe, Austria's government services have been placed under strain by the large number of people moving through and into the country.

It is not unusual for immigration of this sort to lead to political change in a country. Sweden, for example, has seen substantial gains in recent years for the right-wing anti-immigration Sweden Democrats, which has been linked to concern over increases in immigration. In Germany, Angela Merkel's liberal policy towards Syrian refugees has led to a polling surge for the anti-immigration Alternative for Germany party.

There is something in common between these two countries. In Sweden, asylum seeker policy has generally been fairly liberal under both the centre-left and centre-right, while in Germany, the liberal asylum seeker policy has been led by centre-right Merkel. Centre-right voters are less likely to support such an immigration policy, leading them to seek alternatives to the right.

At the moment, Austria is governed by a 'grand coalition' of the centre-left Social Democrats and the centre-right People's Party. A government of this sort presiding over high immigration would be likely to alienate People's Party voters concerned about immigration, and cause them to move towards right-wing alternatives. The largest and most prominent of these is the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO).

This party has a long history in Austria. They were formed in 1949 as the Party of Independents, and won 10% of the vote at their electoral debut. For its early years, it was a more liberal party, which had only a small number of seats. Oddly for a country with a very proportional electoral system, at this time Austria had a very strong two-party system, with the Social Democrats and People's Party often being able to form majority governments.

However, the party began to gain traction under the leadership of Jorg Haider. Haider was a more right-wing figure, and led the party in a Eurosceptic direction. This turned out to be electorally profitable; at the party's first election under Haider's leadership (in 1986), the party increased its vote by 4.7%, and by 6.9% in 1990 (probably related to the previous government being a grand coalition. The continuance of the grand coalition up to the 1994 election meant that their vote went up by 5.9% to 22.5%, despite the liberal wing of the party leaving to form the new Liberal Forum. This result meant that they were close to the centre-right.

The 1999 election was the apex of the Freedom Party's support. The party recieved 26.91% of the vote, the same percentage to two decimal places as the People's Party. However, the Freedom Party recieved 417 votes more than the People's Party, making them narrowly the second largest party. Rather than continuing the grand coalition, the People's Party decided to form a government coalition with the Freedom Party. People's Party leader Wolfgang Schlussel became Chancellor, since the parties had an equal number of seats and the Freedom Party were considered to be too extreme to run the government.

The Freedom Party, as the less visible coalition partner, lost a large portion of its support as a result of the coalition. At the 2002 election, the Freedom Party vote went down to just 10%, with the People's Party's vote going up by 15%.

Nonetheless, the coalition of the People's and Freedom parties continued after the election. However, the Freedom Party split in 2005, with Haider forming the new Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO). This party stayed in the coalition with the People's Party, while the Freedom Party left government.

Internal strife of this sort led to both parties faring poorly at the 2006 election. The Freedom Party won only slightly more votes than their dismal 2002 performance, and polled below the Greens for the first time in their history (only by 538 votes, though), while the BZO only just crossed the 4% threshold under Austria's multi-tier method of party-list proportional representation. It is also worth noting that 2.8% of the vote at this election was taken by the list of Hans-Peter Martin, a Member of the European Parliament who had been prominent in attacking other MEPs for misuse of travel expenses; a populist figure of this nature could be expected to attract the support of Eurosceptic voters who might otherwise be attracted to the Freedom or BZO parties.

However, better days were to come for these two parties. Following the 2006 election, another 'grand coalition' was formed between the two main parties. As has been stated above, such 'grand coalitions' have lead to voter dissatisfaction with the two major parties. The 2006-2008 period also saw the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which expanded the powers of the European Union somewhat, without a referendum. In the early 2008 election, both the Freedom and People's parties gained support, at the expense of both major parties.

Following this election, there was little option other than a grand coalition of the Social Democrats and People's Party. However, this coalition was extraordinary weak for a grand coalition in Austria; the two major parties had only 55% of the vote between them.

The BZO suffered a substantial setback following the election, when leader Jorg Haider died in a car accident. This meant that the gains from the weakening of the grand coalition parties, which continued, went heavily to the Freedom Party. The 2008-2013 grand coalition government served its full term, but, as usual, the following election saw a decline in support for the grand coalition parties.

This loss did not only advantage the Freedom Party, but also a new party that had been formed recently. Canadian-Austrian businessman Frank Stronach formed a party, with the support of a number of existing Members of Parliament, called Team Stronach. It was opposed to the European Union, and supportive of economic liberalism. Stronach's strong financial support for the party propelled it to a fairly strong performance at the election. The other new party, The New Austria, was a liberal, pro-European group, which won a small number of seats.

The expected result of the election was a grand coalition government, as before, but with only a small parliamentary majority (with 92 seats needed, the Social Democrats and People's Party had only 99 seats). 

So, how are the FPO doing?

Since the 2015 election, the events of the migrant crisis have taken place. Certain international media reports have suggested that there has been a surge in far-right support. Now, if we look at FPO votes over time, that certainly does seem to be the case.

2016 vote share from this poll.

It's not hard to see why that would be viewed as a surge. However, that's not the whole story. As I've said above, the Austrian far-right has two other parties in it; Team Stronach and the Alliance for the Future of Austria. If we add these two onto our graph, we get a somewhat different one.

This certainly looks a lot less impressive. The increase from 2013 is only 3% if you factor in the Stronach and Alliance votes, which is hardly a party-system shaking change, and certainly not a 'surge'.  Even if we consider that the Stronach Team may not be as anti-immigration as the Freedom Party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria+Freedom Party (with both parties being fairly anti-immigration, and likely to enter coalition with each other if they had a majority) vote share in 2008 was 28%, which makes the increase only 4%.

But what about the presidentials?

One of the other events that has happened in Austria recently was the presidential elections. In these elections, the Freedom candidate Norbert Hofer came first, with Alexander van der Bellen, the Independent Green, in a poor second.

As you can see, the Freedom Party was comfortably ahead; Hofer is not yet President, as he has to contest a second round against van der Bellen, as no candidate won a majority in the first round. Polls for the second round show both candidates at a dead heat; however, since Hofer was substantially underpolled in the first round, it appears likely that he will be elected President.

So, does this mean that there is a massive surge in support for the Freedom Party? Well, that's uncertain. For a start, the presidential race is highly personalistic, as can be seen by the small votes for the Social Democratic and People's candidates compared to their party polling (and as can also be seen by the posters, which do not show party affiliation for certain candidates), and the large number of votes taken by the independent Griss. The results of the presidential election will not necessarily be borne out in the legislative election.

Second, Hofer has the advantage of running against van der Bellen, who has mostly left-wing support. Had Griss, who had more right-wing support, been in the second round, she could have been more competitive, as she would have been able to mobilise both left-wing (in opposition to Hofer) and right-wing support.

While the underpolling for the presidential elections suggests that there could be underlying support not detected in the polls, the polls for the legislative and European elections were quite close to the actual support for the party.

The increase in support for the Freedom Party should not be seen as a massive upsurge in support for them. Instead, it represents consolidation of the voters sympathetic to the right-wing populist policies espoused by them. The party remains short of a majority; however, if Hofer is elected President (by means that, as stated above, do not necessarily suggest a surge in support either), he will be able to appoint the Prime Minister, and dissolve the legislature. This represents the most substantial challenge for the non-Freedom parties, and suggests potential for a constitutional crisis.

2015 Swedish election cancelled

Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven

Sweden has been a well-covered topic on this blog, and for those starting anew, here is my post on the 2014 election, and here is my post on the proposed 2015 election. 

Anyway, the proposed 2015 election has been called off, after a deal between the centre-left Social Democrat-Green coalition and the centre-right Moderate-Liberal-Centre-Christian Democrat alliance to pass a budget.

In effect, it is a coalition agreement between the centre-left and centre-right. The centre-right, having more seats than the centre-left, will propose a budget. The centre-left will form government, and they will be permitted to change the budget somewhat. The centre-right will abstain on the budget. Both groups will have a common policy on pensions, military issues, and energy.This deal will last until 2022, remaining in force even after the next scheduled election in 2018. 

So, what does this mean for Sweden's future?

The coalition will be able to control Parliament, but it will come at a price. The far-right Sweden Democrats will gain significantly in the polls after an event like this. People who voted for a centre-right party thinking that they would be helping to elect a centre-right government may feel betrayed by the deal, and may respond to the centre-right's behaviour by voting for the far-right.

This idea is borne out by multiple cases. From 2005 to 2009, Germany was led by a grand coalition between Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democrats. Merkel became Chancellor, and the Social Democrats were perceived as sellouts. At the 2009 election, the Social Democrats lost 11% of the vote compared to 2005, with the Greens and Left parties gaining by about 3 points each. 

In Austria, the 2006 election was followed by a grand coalition between the centre-right Austrian People's Party and the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats got the prime ministership. When the Austrian People's Party pulled out of coalition, an election was called. At that election, both parties lost votes to the far-right, but the People's Party's losses were heavier.

In short, it is probable that the 2018 Sweden election will result in  losses for the centre-right and gains for the far-right. The current coalition will almost certainly control parliament from 2018 to 2022, but the tide of the Sweden Democrats will not be turned by this coalition, at least electorally.

Sweden 2015-The end of the two-coalition system as we know it (for now)

Sweden's 2014 election was covered before on this blog, but another one is taking place at the initiative of the Prime Minister, Stefan Lofven. Lofven, a Social Democrat who formed a minority government after the 2014 election, has called an election for the 22nd of March in 2015.

The 2014 election resulted in a 'victory' for the Social Democrats, at least in the sense of being the largest party. However, the Social Democrats won only 31% of the vote and 113 seats in the 349 member Riksdag (Swedish parliament). Exempting 2010, this is the worst result for the Social Democrats since 1914.

The main opposition Moderate Party, who governed from 2006 to 2014 in alliance with the centre-right Christian Democrat, Centre and Liberal parties, did poorly in the 2014 election. They won 23.3% of the vote and 84 seats. The result is the worst since 2002; the Swedish centre-right is more diverse than the left, and votes transfer between the four right-leaning parties more fluidly.

So, why all these bad results for the two largest parties in Sweden? Well, as explained in the previous post, the reason is all to do with the rise of the far-right Sweden Democrats. The party, traditionally marginalised in Sweden's political environment, entered the Riksdag with 5.7% of the vote in the 2010 election and won 20 seats.

The party's policies, attacking immigrants and the European Union while strongly supporting welfare programs were unattractive in the boom times of the 2000s, and irrelevant in the long period of Social Democrat government before Europe and immigration became problems.

However, the Global Financial Crisis gave new life to far-right and far-left movements across Europe. Established parties like the Irish Fianna Fail party and the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal were decimated, and government formation was complicated in countries that needed stability.

In 2010, the Sweden Democrats had no impact on government formation. A poor performance by the Social Democrats allowed the Moderate-led government to win a minority government, which was able to keep the government in office for the full term.

However, the 2014 results were inconclusive. The left (Social Democrats, Greens, Left Party) won 159 seats, the centre-right won 141 seats, and the remaining 49 seats went to the Sweden Democrats. Social Democrat leader Stefan Lofven nonetheless became Prime Minister in a coalition with the Green Party.

To some extent, the coalition was doomed the moment it was formed. While Social Democrat-Greens  relations were cordial, the coalition simply did not have the votes. 138 votes, just 40% of the Riksdag, is simply not enough for a government.

Lofven's budget was defeated on the third of December with 182 votes against and 153 votes for and the Sweden Democrats and all centre-right parties voting against. After this defeat, it was blatantly obvious that the government could not continue. Lofven called a press conference, and announced that an election would take place on the 22nd of March.

Why an election?

The question is an obvious one. The Sweden Democrats are polling well, with about 14% on average. Another election would only slightly worsen the position of all moderate political parties at the expense of the Sweden Democrats. 

Well, there may be a personal motive for Lofven. A big Sweden Democrat presence, and complete ungovernability for either coalition could give reason for a 'grand coalition', obviously led by the Social Democrats. A government comprised of the Moderate and Social Democrat parties, with another small party (perhaps the Liberals) supporting them would have 216 seats, and would be more stable, at least in terms of a parliamentary majority.

Also, it is important to remember that Lofven, at the moment, has no choice. An inability to pass a budget, and the intransigence of the centre-right means that he is unable to control the current parliament. An election is the only way out, and the possibility of a grand coalition is too slim in the current parliament to delay such an election.

The end of the two-coalition system

For the last 8 years, Swedish elections have been contested between two vague coalitions. The centre-right coalition, called the Alliance for Sweden, is comprised of the Liberal Party (liberalism, pro-Europe), the Moderate Party (conservative), the Christian Democrats (social conservatism), and the Centre Party (liberalism, agrarianism). The centre-left coalition, formerly known as the Red-Greens, is comprised of the Social Democrats (centre-left, social democratic), the Green Party (left-wing, green politics), and the Left Party (post-communist, radical leftist). 

However, this comfortable two-party style competition has ended abruptly with the rise of the Sweden Democrats. This is similar to Italy, where the rise of the 5 Star Movement has meant that neither the left nor the right is able to hold a majority. 

What does this mean? Well, it means that, at least for now, coalitions that bridge the divide between the left and the right will be the norm.

Austria is in a similar situation. The Social Democrats and People's Party are currently in a grand coalition, after neither party were able to form government due to the presence of the far-right liberal Freedom Party. This coalition has reduced the support of both parties at the expense of the Freedom Party and other right-wing populist parties.

A grand coalition will be bad for all parties in it, as the Austrian and German examples have shown. However, it will be necessary to have one, to ensure that Sweden has stable government and fewer snap elections.

Is Europe's far-right heading for power? Part 3-France

France's European elections produced some of the most astonishing results in Europe. A first-place result for the National Front was picked up by many news sources as evidence of a huge far-right and Eurosceptic surge across Europe. However, it is questionable whether this result represents a swinging of opinion against the EU, or simply the swinging of people who were already Eurosceptics against the EU.

What were the results?

At the last European elections in France, the National Front won the most votes. They won 24.85% of the vote, and 24 seats out of 74. The centre-right Union for a Popular Movement won 20.8% and 20 seats, a loss of 7% from the last elections. The big losers were the Socialists, the governing party, who won just 14% of the vote and 13 seats. The Greens (or as they are known in France, Europe-Ecology) won 9% and 6 seats, down from a record-breaking 16% at the last election (a result that owed more to the utter ineptness of the Socialists than a positive result for them). A centrist pro-euro coalition of the Democratic Movement and Union of Democrats and Independents won 10% and 7 seats.

The result was certainly poor for the Socialists, and no amount of positive analysis can change that. The Socialists have never done well in European elections, but this is below their previous nadir of 14.5% in 1994 (and that was with a Radical list to split the Socialist vote and an unpopular president).

The UMP, too, have suffered. A divisive leadership contest between  Francois Fillon and Jean-Francois Cope reduced support for the party. The party was unpopular in 2009, and the centre-right have always done poorly in European elections, but 20.8% is a bad result for an opposition party (the party has has one poorer result in 2004, with 16%, and that was with the centre-right Union for French Democracy running an independent list).

The National Front can celebrate. 24.9% of the vote is not especially strong, but it is the best result that the party has got, and the best result for an openly Eurosceptic party in any European election. But does this mean that Eurosceptic support has significantly increased?

The Eurosceptic vote in France

France has had a long string of Eurosceptic parties. However, most of the early right-wing Eurosceptic parties merged into the UMP at its formation. The graph below shows the results for Eurosceptic parties at each European election year.


The following parties are coded as Eurosceptic: Rally for France, Movement for France, French Communist Party, National Front, Hunting Fishing Nature Tradition, National Republican Movement, Workers Struggle, Revolutionary Communist League, LIBERTAS, Arise the Republic, New Anticapitalist Party.

As you can see, the recent high point of the Eurosceptic vote was in 1999. At this election, the right-wing Rally for France-Movement for France list came second, beating the centre-right Rally for the Republic  list (led by a young Nicholas Sarkozy). The  Communists and National Front also did well. The Eurosceptic vote dropped dramatically in 2004, perhaps influenced by the slight rightward shift of the new UMP and the collapse of the Rally for France.

In 2009, President Sarkozy was in power. Sarkozy is on the right of the UMP, and he captured a large share of the National Front vote at his first presidential election. The French Communists were slowly but surely collapsing, and the LIBERTAS party was not strong enough to provide a coherent alternative. As a result, the openly Eurosceptic vote dropped again.

In 2014, the landscape was very different. The UMP were unpopular and divided, which turned off Eurosceptic voters. The Communists slighly increased their vote, but they were not attractive to the right-wing. The only moderate Eurosceptics, Arise the Republic, were too small and irrelevant to have any impact.

The fact is that a moderate Eurosceptic party, such as UKIP, could probably soak up a large share of the National Front vote. And National Front leader Marine Le Pen knows this. She has made tough decisions to clean out her party, expelling some avowedly Nazi members.

But what does this all mean?

The National Front tend to do better at European elections in terms of seats. This is because European elections take place using proportional representation, In National Assembly elections, a different method is used- the two-round system. Under the two-round system, there are two elections. At the first election, all candidates may participate. If no candidate wins a majority in the first round, a second round is held, where the top two, as well as any candidates above 12.5% compete. A plurality is needed to win in this round.

This system tends to encourage centrists and moderates, and to discourage extremist or divisive candidates. For example, at the 1958 election, the French Communist Party won 18.9% in the first round and 20% in the second round, but only 10 seats out of 546. However, this quality makes it extremely disproportional.

The two-round system has severely limited the National Front's parliamentary representation. Despite winning 13.6% in the first round in the 2012 legislative elections, the party won only two seats out of 577, while the smaller moderate Radical Party of the Left, in alliance with the Socialists, received 12 seats on 1.65% of the first-round vote.

It is therefore unlikely that the National Front will win a large share of seats in the next National Assembly elections. Certainly, they will win more. Right-wing UMP candidates may endorse National Front candidates over Socialists, and there will almost certainly be a significant number of National Front deputies in the next National Assembly. However, it will be a minority, and the Socialist group will almost certainly be larger.

Presidential elections-could Marine Le Pen win?

Another oft-repeated scenario was the possibility of Marine Le Pen winning the presidential election. Some polls show Le Pen beating Hollande in a runoff. However, there is a serious problem with this idea. For a start, every candidate from the UMP would beat Le Pen, as left voters are more likely to vote for the right to beat the National Front than the reverse. Second of all, the UMP's support is low, but the UMP candidate would almost certainly run in a second round against Le Pen, and the only scenario in which a Hollande-Le Pen runoff would happen is if there was an independent centre-right candidate. 

In short, while the National Front have the ability to be a larger and more relevant party, due to the charactaristics of France's electoral system, it is unlikely that they will win any political power.

Is Europe's far-right heading for power? Part 2-Greece

Following the most recent elections for the European parliament, many stories have been written about a 'far-right surge' in Europe. However, many of these claims appear to have been overstated, and some of the parties that have been alleged to have put in a good performance actually did not poll especially well, or poll in a way that stands to affect the long-term future of Europe or its countries.

Greece

Greece's far-right Golden Dawn party first entered parliament in the May 2012 national elections, after spending many years on the political sidelines. I am not here to dispute the status of this party as far-right, and it is probably second only to the German National Democrats as the most far-right party in the European Parliament. Members of the party have made many controversial statemnents in the past surrounding Nazi Germany, and the group's logo, well, resembles a swatstika.

The party's entry to the European Parliament was certainly noticed by the international media. However, the party's result (9.5% of the vote) was consistent with what opinion polls had been showing the party at.

In fact, the Greek European elections were very significant, but not really for Golden Dawn. The main contest of the election was between the governing centre-right New Democracy party, and the radical left-wing SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left). The election was widely regarded as a test of public confidence in the Greek recovery and economic direction.

The collapse of Greece's financial system during the Global Financial Crisis sent an earthquake through the nation's political system. At the first post-crisis election in 2012, the two traditional parties of Greek government, New Democracy and the Panhellinic Socialist Movement (PASOK) , won just 32% of the vote combined, down from 77% of the vote at the last election. PASOK fell the furthest, from 43% of the vote in 2009 to just 13% in May 2012.

Most of the PASOK vote was taken up by SYRIZA, a coalition of radical-leftist parties formed in 2004. The predecessor party Synaspismós (Coalition of the Progressive Left) was formed in the late 1980s. The group was marginalised in the 2000s, winning an average of 4% of the vote, and coming behind the far-right LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally) and the KKE (Communist Party of Greece)

Interestingly, neither the KKE or LAOS benefited much in July 2012. LAOS had become discredited after it voted with PASOK in favour of the bailout. Much of the LAOS electorate moved to Golden Dawn. The KKE are still irrelevant. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the majority of ex-communist parties opted to modernise, accept the world order, and move on. KKE didn't do that, instead opting to hide under some coats and pretend that Joseph Stalin was still in control and that the Soviet Union was alive and well. They hate SYRIZA almost as much as they hate PASOK or New Democracy, they produce long and rambling communiques about topics that nobody cares about (in English!), and they refuse to participate in government. All in all, they aren't worth listening to.

Three new parties benefited from the collapse of the majors. The largest was Independent Greeks (ANEL), a split-off from New Democracy. They are a conservative, soft-nationalist, soft-Eurosceptic, anti-austerity party: sort of Golden Dawn Lite. A smaller group, Democratic Left (DIMAR), which split off from SYRIZA, is a centre-left pro-European party. Democratic Left claim to represent the centre-left ground between PASOK and SYRIZA. They are mildly anti-austerity, but they participate in a pro-austerity government, unlike SYRIZA. And then, there is Golden Dawn.

Golden Dawn are by no means new. The foundations were laid by the early 1980s, and the group stayed as an alliance of far-right thugs until 1993, when it was formally registered as a political party. It first ran in an election in 1994, winning 0.1% of the votes for the European Parliament. The party won 0.07% in the 1996 general election. The group put in a decent performance in the European elections in 1999, winning 0.75% in alliance with the far-right First Line party. The party won 0.3% in the 2009 election; at that point, they were still irrelevant.

However, the financial crisis breathed new life into the party. The party's relations with radical street gangs turned out to be an advantage, as these gangs were able to peform a kind of 'Robin Hood' role in standing up for the 'underdog' (as long as the underdog isn't a socialist, homosexual, an immigrant, or someone whose great-great-great-great grandfather wasn't authentically Greek). This positioning is in line with most other European far-right parties (socially conservative, but economically leftist). The party's lack of participation in govenment meant that they were a 'fresh face' for Greece, and their previous irrelevance fit in with Greece's anti-politican mood.

This positioning allowed Golden Dawn to enter parliament in July 2012. They won 7% of the vote, and 21 seats in the 300 member Greek Parliament. Their strong result, as well as strong results for other anti-austerity parties, meant that another election had to take place in June.

In the June elections, held after no government could be formed, the results were quite different. New Democracy won 29.7% of the vote, a gain of about 10%. SYRIZA won 27% of the vote: again, a gain of about 10%. PASOK fell to 12%, while ANEL's vote dropped 3% to 7%. Golden Dawn lost 0.05% of the vote and 3 seats, while DIMAR's vote went up fractionally (0.14%) but the party actually lost two seats. The Communists lost 4% of the vote and 14 seats. The extra-parliamentary parties generally lost votes, with the liberal Bridges alliance (a coalition of the centrist Action, Liberal Alliance and Recreate Greece parties), the Ecologist Greens, and the Popular Orthodox Rally, which all came close to the 3% threshold in May, losing votes.

The results were roughly in line with what had been expected. The election became polarised around the contest between SYRIZA and New Democracy, with all other parties losing out. However, the performances by Golden Dawn and DIMAR were unexpected. Golden Dawn might have been expected to lose out, given the increased profile given to its more extreme members (in one unfortunate incident, a Golden Dawn spokesperson physically assualted a leftist politician on live television.) However, they did okay. DIMAR, too, might have been expected to be squeezed by the New Democracy-SYRIZA contest, but they held their ground, and entered government.

The Actual European Election

The European election, held in May 2014 in conjunction with some local elections, saw a similar cast of parties. There were only two differences. PASOK had teamed up with a number of tiny irrelevant centre-left parties to form Elia (The Olive Tree). This appears to be more of a disguise for PASOK than an actual coalition of equals. However, this did not stop the party arguing over it, with former Prime Minister George Papendreou criticising the alliance (Admittedly, this criticism did come from a man who presided over the most disastrous election in the party's history).

The other new party was formed just before the European elections. It is called The River, and was founded by journalist Stavros Theodokrais. The party is socially liberal and socially democratic, but has vague policies, and trades heavily off the popularity of its leader. It is a member of the centre-left European Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. Along with this, there was the usual cast of irrelevant single-issue parties that come out at the European election.

Other then that, one might expect the election to result in a higher vote for protest parties, given that there was no need to elect a government. Adding to this, opinion polling had consistently shown that Golden Dawn was going to be Greece's third party.

So, what did the results look like? Well, they were good for SYRIZA, although somewhat underwhelming, as some within the party expected that the party would win 30% (which some polls had shown them at). Instead, they won 26.6%, about 4 points ahead of New Democracy. Golden Dawn managed 9.4% and third place, while Elia came fourth, with 8%. The River came fifth, with 6.6% of the vote. The Communists got 6.1%, while ANEL got just 3.5%.

The result was okay for Elia/PASOK. While 8% is by no means good, it is above the dismal polls for the party. Golden Dawn performed more or less about their polled numbers, while ND polled slightly below (Bear in mind that these are general election polls). DIMAR collapsed, with just 1.2% of the vote and no Members of the European Parliament.

But what does this mean for the governability of Greece? Well, in Greece, the electoral system is nationwide proportional representation, but with a 50 seat bonus for the largest party. Taking that into account, the results would be as below.

So, what would this mean for the future of Greece? Well, the current New Democracy-PASOK government would have only 113 seats, 38 seats short of a majority. SYRIZA would have to become part of government, as SYRIZA+Golden Dawn+KKE is equal to a majority. A SYRIZA-PASOK government would have a narrow majority of 154, while a SYRIZA-River coalition would have exactly 150 seats. Not an ideal scenario for stable government. However, the dreaded 'negative majority', where the two parties that will not participate in government (Golden Dawn and the Communists) win 151 seats, would not happen.

In fact, Golden Dawn has burned too many bridges to enter government. The closest party in terms of ideology is ANEL, and they are a party in decline. The chances of Golden Dawn having any serious input on government is highly unlikely, and the boost they have recieved by the recession is likely to disappear in any serious recovery, leaving them where they started.